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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis addresses the topic of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting. This topic 
has been widely addressed by the researches in the United States of America (US) after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act due to the increase of responsibilities on these controls. Italy has followed 
the US regulation with the law number 262 of 2005 and Internal Controls over Financial 
Reporting have become of the interest of the regulators and of the companies that have to 
implement their evaluation.  
The thesis aims to analyze the effectiveness of Internal Controls over Financial 
Reporting. The effectiveness can be analyzed looking at the output of the Internal Controls over 
Financial Reporting evaluation or looking at the procedures used in this evaluation.  
The outputs of the evaluation are the Internal Control Deficiencies found and disclosed 
to the market by the responsible for Internal Controls over Financial Reporting, that usually is 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Literature based on Sarbanes-Oxley Act usually uses this 
approach because in US is possible to have public data on Internal Control Deficiencies 
disclosed to the market. In Italy this kind of disclosure is limited, thus one part of the thesis 
analyzes the Internal Control Deficiencies found by the companies but not disclosed to the 
market because under the materiality level. The thesis looks at the Internal Auditor Detection 
Process to understand where are the problems that bring to more severe and persistent Internal 
Control Deficiencies and look for the type of Internal Control Deficiencies more severe and 
persistent. The idea under this research is to find the more problematic issues where the 
companies have to focus to increase the effectiveness of their Internal Controls over Financial 
Reporting. 
Because of this difficulty in data availability for Internal Control Deficiencies, the 
effectiveness have been analyzed looking at the procedures used to evaluate the Internal 
Controls over Financial Reporting. The procedures have been analyzed looking at the quality 
of each phase of the audit cycle. The Internal Controls over Financial Reporting have been 
divided in its components of Entity Level Controls, Account-specific Controls and Information 
Technology Controls. Information Technology Controls Quality has been then related to audit 
risk and audit fees to see the relation between internal controls and external controls performed 
by external auditors. The idea under this research is that if the internal controls are effective 
and assure a higher reliability of financial reporting, the external auditors can reduce their work.  
4 
 
Finally Information Technology Controls have been deeply investigates in their relevant 
component of outsourced controls. Based on specific frameworks, one part of the thesis address 
the Audit Quality of Outsourced Information Technology Controls, that is of significant interest 
nowadays. The idea under this research is that the evaluation of these controls without going 
directly in the outsourcers’ location is not enough to assure the effectiveness and the reliability 
of financial reporting that use the information technology controlled. Even if the standards let 
to use indirect evaluation or service auditors’ attestations, the thesis proposes to use the direct 
evaluation for a better effectiveness.  
 
Thus, the thesis is structured in three studies: 
1. Audit Quality of Outsourced Information Technology Controls. 
2. Information Technology Controls Quality and Audit Fees: Evidence from Italy. 
3. Internal Auditor Detection Process and Internal Control Deficiencies Types. 
The order of the presentation follows the advancement of the paper for the publication.  
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Audit Quality of 
Outsourced InformationTechnology Controls 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to test the positive relationship between audit quality (AQ) of 
outsourced information technology controls (ITC) and information technology audit quality 
(ITAQ). 
Design/methodology/approach – Factor analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and 
simulations. 
Findings – Scoping and planning phases of the audit cycle account for about 69 per cent of 
ITAQ. The AQ of outsourced ITC is strongly and directly related to ITAQ. Improvement of 
AQ of outsourced ITC may be achieved through evaluation of control design and operating 
effectiveness by service auditor as well as direct evaluation by the client in service provider 
location. 
Research limitations/implications – Sample size and input items in factor analysis. 
Practical implications – Companies and auditors could improve ITAQ through a better 
organization of the scoping and planning activities; they could also improve the AQ of 
outsourced ITC using direct evaluation in the service provider location supplemented with 
service auditor reports. Regulators could refine or change laws and frameworks to take into 
account the factors of ITAQ and the methodology of evaluation of outsourced ITC. 
Originality/value – Private data collected by questionnaire. The measures of ITAQ and the OLS 
model could be tested in future research, in countries with different frameworks and regulations 
related to AQ, different weight of outsourced information technology and other characteristics 
related to clients, service providers and service auditors. 
 
Keywords: Information technology, Outsourcing, Internal controls, Audit quality, Financial 
reporting 
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Information Technology Controls Quality and 
Audit Fees: Evidence from Italy 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study analyzes the impact of Information Technology (IT) Controls quality on 
control risk and audit fees. It tests the reduction of control risk when IT Controls quality 
increases. The relation is expected when the regulation increases sensitiveness to audit risk 
assessment. The research focuses on IT Controls as part of Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting, particularly on scoping quality, segregation of duties and Controls framework 
compliance. 
Design/methodology/approach – The research was conducted with a questionnaire on the 
population of Italian listed companies. Ordinary least square regressions are performed to test 
the expected relation between audit fees and IT Controls.  
Findings – Audit fees decrease according to IT scoping quality, IT Controls segregation of 
duties and IT Controls framework compliance. The overall conclusion is that IT Controls 
quality decreases control risk, audit fees, audit effort and support the audit risk model. 
Originality/value – Results, mainly based on private data, fill the gap of the literature related to 
the reduction of audit fees when the improvement of IT Controls reduces control risk. 
Practical Implications – Given that improved IT Controls quality reduces audit fees, regulators 
and auditors have strong grounds for promoting: 1) the application of the COmmittee of 
Sponsoring Organization framework in the manufacturing and services industry; 2) IT map and 
IT segregation of duties  in the financial industry. 
 
Keywords: Audit Fees, Audit Risk, Internal Audit, Internal Control, Information Technology 
auditing 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study tests the reduction of audit fees resulting from higher quality of Information 
Technology (IT) Controls which may result from a reduction of control risk and audit effort. 
When control risk decreases thanks to higher control quality, auditors can place more trust in 
internal controls and thus make less effort in the audit [1]1and charge lower audit fees. IT plays 
an essential role in accounting information systems and IT Controls are a key element of 
Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICFR). We therefore investigate the role of IT 
Controls quality in reducing audit fees.  
Prior literature analyzed the relationship between audit effort and audit risk and found 
that before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (SOX), the audit plan was often  not fully risk-
adjusted in defining of the amount of audit hours and audit fees. Some specific results show 
that audit effort are responsive when the audit risk increases but not when audit risk decreases. 
Furthermore,  prior studies find a relation between audit effort and inherent risk but not between 
audit effort and control risk. This study contributes to filling gaps in the literature covering the 
relationship between audit effort and control risk, by  analyzing the case where control risk 
decreases and ICFR become more stringent. 
Control risk can decrease as a results of regulation on ICFR evaluation, such as SOX 
and other national legislation. The work of Hogan and Wilkins (2008) and Hoitash et al. (2008) 
found that SOX strengthened the negative relation between ICFR and audit effort. Following 
this work, we investigate whether Italian legislation, known as “Light SOX” brings the same 
benefits.  
We examine IT Controls, focusing on IT Controls scoping quality, IT Controls 
segregation of duties and IT Controls framework compliance. IT Controls scoping quality is 
evaluated  using three  instruments: 1) IT map of financial application and infrastructure 
services; 2) IT risk assessment; 3) IT link with business. The segregation of duties in IT 
Controls typically involves separating out the three duties of responsibility, test execution and 
remediation. But the segregation of duties is different in IT Controls compared to other internal 
controls because a high level of skills is needed in both  IT and auditing. IT Controls framework 
                                                 
1 [1] “Obtaining sufficient evidence to support control risk assessments of low for purposes of the financial 
statement audit ordinarily allows the auditor to reduce the amount of audit work that otherwise would have been 
necessary to opine on the financial statements”, PCAOB – Auditing Standard 5 – Paragraph 8, p. 22. 
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compliance, in this research, means the voluntary adoption of United States of America (USA) 
IT Controls frameworks. We evaluate IT Controls framework compliance by comparing the 
companies’ number of processes and objectives to IT framework requirements. 
We collected private data on IT Controls through interviews and questionnaires, with 
the cooperation of listed companies and audit firms. We collected data on audit fees and on 
control variables directly from consolidated financial reporting and Stock Exchange databases. 
Results indicate that audit fees decrease when there is an increase in IT scoping quality, 
IT Controls segregation of duties and IT Controls framework compliance. IT map and IT 
segregation of duties (as key components of IT scoping quality) reduce audit fees in financial 
industry: this industry has invested great resources in mapping financial applications and IT 
infrastructure services and in implementing an efficient IT segregation of duties between the 
Internal Audit department, the IT department or other departments.  
 Our results support the application of the Commission Of Sponsoring Organization 
(COSO) framework in manufacturing and services industry. This industry, mainly 
characterized by small and medium companies and less complex processes, may improve IT 
Controls quality following the requirements of COSO framework. 
 The overall interpretation is that higher IT Controls quality decreases control risk and 
audit fees, which supports the validity of the audit risk model. Our findings support that the 
legislation in Italy makes audit effort more sensitive to control risk,  when control risk decreases 
and internal control quality increases.  
Based on prior results, regulators and auditors can stress the application of the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organization framework in manufacturing and services industry, and  
the IT map and the IT segregation of duties  in financial industry. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section Two reviews the literature 
and develops the research question. Section Three explains the method (model, interviews, 
questionnaire and database, sample). Sections Four, Five and Six show respectively descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix, regression results and sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 
Seven highlights the conclusions. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION DEVELOPMENT 
 
The audit risk model presented in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47 (American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA] 1983) says that for a given client the 
acceptable audit risk is a function of inherent risk, control risk and detection risk.  
The model implies the relations showed in Figure 1. Relation (a) shows the relation 
between IT Controls quality and control risk: an increase in ICFR quality, in its component of 
IT Controls, has an impact on audit risk decreasing control risk. 
Relation (b) underlines the impact of control risk on detection risk, given relation (a). 
When control risk decreases thanks to an increase in IT Controls quality, auditors can place 
more trust in internal controls, including IT controls, and can thus set up the planned detection 
risk based on control risk, establishing less substantive tests. 
Relation (c) links detection risk and audit fees, given relations (a) and (b). Establishing 
less substantive tests because the IT Controls quality is high, the auditors can plan less effort in 
the audit. Planning less effort means that auditors can reduce audit fees.  
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To develop our research question, we focus on the literature that examines the relation 
between audit effort and audit risk:  
 
 Early studies in the late 1980s found that the change in risk has an effect on audit effort in 
only one direction: when the change is positive and the risk increases. Biggs et al. (1988) 
in an experimental study found that audit effort increased when risks were considered to 
have gone up,  but did  not decrease for lower risks. Bedard (1989), in an archival study, 
found that audit effort was lower when internal control evaluation was favorable (low 
control risk) but was not higher  in the opposite case. We thus identify a gap in the literature 
regarding the association between control risk and audit effort.  There appears to be no 
research demonstrating that audit effort decreases when this relevant component of audit 
risk model decreases. 
 Other studies present separate findings for inherent risk and control risk. O'Keefe et al. 
(1994), and Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997) find that audit effort is responsive to inherent 
risk but not to control risk. This is a further gap in the literature: there appears to be no  
detailed research on the impact of control risk on audit effort. 
 
More recent studies use audit fees as a proxy for audit effort. Following these studies, 
we too use audit fees as a proxy for audit effort, as has been found to be the case in studies with 
data available for both auditor labor hours and audit fees (Bell et al., 2001). These studies 
support prior results. Felix et al. (2001) find that audit effort is responsive to inherent risk but 
not to control risk.  
 
So the relation between audit effort and audit risk appears to be largely unexplored in 
cases where control risk decreases. The present study aims to fill these gaps by testing how 
increased IT Controls quality reduces control risk and audit effort. 
 
The literature concludes that audit effort was not strongly risk-adjusted prior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which is inconsistent  with the audit risk model. The results of 
Mock and Wright (1993), Bedard and Wright (1994), DiPietro et al. (1994), Quadackers et al. 
(1996), Mock e Wright (1999) do not reveal a significant relationship between audit effort and 
changes in risks. 
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Hogan and Wilkins (2008) and Hoitash et al. (2008), however, show that  SOX increased 
auditors' sensitivity to control risk. These authors support the finding by Raghunandan e Rama 
(2006) that audit fees for companies with internal control problems are significantly higher and 
the fee effect is economically significant. Similar results were found by Krishnan et al. (2008) 
for audit fees associated with SOX 404, and by Bedard et al. (2008) for non-accelerated filers. 
 
We opt to test for a reduction of audit fees when control risk decreases given that Law 
262/2005 in Italy was intended to perform the same functions as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 in the USA.  Unlike Hogan and Wilkins (2008), Hoitash et al. (2008), Raghunandan e 
Rama (2006), Krishnan et al. (2008), Bedard et al. (2008), who all use public data on internal 
control deficiencies, we use private data on the audit risk process. Private data can yields better 
insight into the ‘black-box’ of audit activity.  
 
Previous studies on ICFR deficiencies classified internal controls by nature into entity 
level, IT and account-specific controls, as first suggested by Doyle et al. (2007). Azzali and 
Mazza (2011) suggest the same classification for IT Controls. Our contribution is to investigate 
IT Controls quality  as a key aspect of ICFR quality. IT plays an essential role in accounting 
information systems and IT Controls are a key element of ICFR. We focus on control risk 
related to IT because of its importance in audit pricing, as shown by Hoitash et al. (2008). They 
find that audit fees vary according to the nature of controls for companies with internal control 
deficiencies.  
 
Our contribution is related to the insights into the functioning of internal control systems 
of IT Controls in specific companies and how this interact or stand out in comparison with the 
previous fee findings (Hay et al., 2006). Among the several elements that can affect IT Controls 
quality, we select 3 variables: IT Controls scoping; IT Controls segregation of duties; IT 
Controls framework compliance. All these variables are related to the planning stage. 
We expect that IT Controls quality will increase when IT Controls scoping identifies 
riskier IT linked to a company. Scoping is the process of selecting elements for inclusion in the 
audit cycle and consists  of: identifying all elements to be included in the audit cycle (IT MAP); 
selecting  riskier elements which may lead to a material misstatement in the financial reporting 
from this map (IT RISK); selecting the IT elements with strongest links to  the business from 
the map (IT LINK). Previous research describes additional IT RISKS linked to electronic data 
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processing and its specific areas (Enterprise Resource Planning analyzed by Hahn, 1999; 
O'Leary, 2000;Jones and Hunton, 2000; Brady et al., 2001;Wright and Wright, 2002;Hunton et 
al., 2004;Brazel, 2005; Brown and Nasuti, 2005; Brody and Kearns, 2009; Kuhn and Sutton, 
2010; Electronic Data Interchange analyzed by Hansen and Hill, 1989; Morris and Pushkin, 
1995; Schneider, 1995). IT LINK is based on the principle that IT scoping cannot be separated 
from business scoping. Henderson and Venkatraman (1992) suggest a model for strategic 
alignment. Chan et al. (1998) indicate that information system alignment has a positive impact 
on business performance, which is supported by other studies (Kearns and Lederer, 2000; 
Tallon et al., 2000; Cragg et al., 2002; Tallon, 2003; Avison et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2006). 
Sabherwal and Chan (2001) indicate that alignment affects perceived business performance,  
but only in some organizations.  
Next, we expect that IT Controls quality will increase when IT Controls assignment of 
duties is efficient. Because of the high number of groups potentially involved in assessing and 
managing the field, assigning duties and responsibility to different departments (IT Controls 
segregation of duties) is one cause of the complexity of IT that requires investigation in order 
to have a measure of IT Controls quality. The groups potentially involved include managers, 
evaluators (internal and external auditors) and system designers (IT departments, in-house 
experts or outside consultants) (International Federation of Accountants- IFAC, 1995; 
Hermanson et al., 2000; Norman et al., 2009). Difficult communications, cooperation and 
integration between managers/evaluators and system designers are some of the main problems 
in IT audit cycles. IT requires specific skills often possessed only by system designers. But 
compliance with both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and with Law 262/2005  requires business and 
audit skills possessed only by managers and evaluators (Cannon and Crowe, 2004; 
McCausland, 2004). Nichols (1987) and Ashton et al. (1991) indicate that the segregation of 
duties is essential to ensure internal control system reliability. Ashton (1974) reports that the 
segregation of duties accounted for 76.7 per cent of the variance in auditors' internal control 
system evaluation decisions, a finding which was supported by Hamilton and Wright (1982). 
Further studies analyze the segregation of duties in audit functions (Malguzzi, 2007; Bencini et 
al., 2008; Servato, 2008; Bencini and Filippini, 2009). In line with the above studies on the 
different skills possessed by groups, IT Controls RESPONSIBILITY should normally be 
assigned to IT departments (Ziegenfuss, 2008). And in line with the above studies on the 
importance of the segregation of duties, TEST EXECUTION should not be assigned to IT 
departments because this could undermine the reliability of financial reporting and bring the 
19 
 
risk of mistakes or fraud. It should rather be assigned to other evaluators, such as the Internal 
Audit function (Control Objectives for Information and related Technology - COBIT for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2006; PCAOB, 2007). However in small-medium companies which are 
very widespread in Italy, Internal Audit may not perform robust evaluation because of its low 
level of IT specific skills. The activity of REMEDIATION is linked to IT CONTROLS 
RESPONSIBILITY.  
Finally, we expect that IT Controls quality will increase when the number of processes 
and objectives to perform the test is efficiently defined in relation to the framework. In Italy 
there is no separate authority setting guidelines. Italian listed firms usually refer to USA 
frameworks. The two frameworks, Commission Of Sponsoring Organization - COSO Report, 
and the Control OBjectives for Information Technology – COBIT, most widely used on a 
voluntary basis in Italy (Azzali and Mazza, 2013) were selected for our study to investigate IT 
CONTROLS FRAMEWORKS COMPLIANCE. Many studies examine COSO and COBIT 
reports, (Lainhart, 2000; Panko, 2006; Kuhn, 2007; Tuttle and Vandervelde, 2007; Garelli, 
2009; Bernroider and Ivanov, 2011;Cereola and Cereola,2011; Mishra and Weistroffer, 2007; 
Merhout and Havelka, 2008). COSO is a model for internal controls and corporate governance 
(Harris 2006). Although it was not designed for IT Controls, it can be applied to IT Controls 
(Linkhous, 2008; Wallace et al., 2011). The 2006 version of COSO covers IT Controls in 
Principle No. 14, where it is classified into four processes: systems development, change 
management, security and logical access and computer operations. The same taxonomy is used 
in Auditing Standard 5 (PCAOB, 2009). COBIT for Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a model for IT 
Controls, especially for IT Controls related to financial reporting (COBIT for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 2006). It describes approximately 12 processes divided into nearly 80 control objectives.  
 
To summarize,  we expect that a high level of IT Controls quality decreases audit fees 
because internal auditors map correctly, select IT elements that are risky and linked to the 
business, and combine IT and audit skills in assigning duties and defining the number of 
processes and objectives. All this allows external auditors to build on the work of the internal 
auditors and thus to reduce their effort in planning. Our research question is the following: 
 
 Does IT Controls quality decrease audit fees? 
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 Testing the research question that IT Controls quality decreases audit fees, the study 
aims to show that an improvement of this component of ICFR is likely that produces a reduction 
of control risk and audit efforts. 
 
 
3. METHOD 
 
3.1. Model 
 
We summarize the research question in the following model:  
 
AUDIT FEES= α + β1IT MAP + β2IT RISK + β3 IT LINK + β4 IT CONTROLS 
SEGREGATION OF DUTIES + β3IT CONTROLS FRAMEWORK COMPLIANCE + 
∑ 𝛽6𝑛=4 n CONTROL VARIABLES + YEAR FIX EFFECT  
 
The study uses a cross-sectional ordinary least square (OLS) audit fees regression 
model, with the dependent variable measured with the natural log of audit fees. As regards the 
independent variables we measure IT Controls scoping with three specific variables based on 
frameworks definitions. Firstly, we measure IT MAP as the presence of a matrix that includes 
the list and the description of financial applications and IT infrastructure services (COBIT for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2006, p. 27/28). Secondly, we measure the IT RISK assessment as the 
presence of an activity that evaluates the likelihood and the impact of the misstatement that one 
IT element could have on the financial reporting (COBIT for Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2006, p. 
31/32). Finally, we measure the IT LINK with business as the presence of an activity that 
determines whether the IT elements support the business (COBIT for Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2006, 
p. 12/13). We predict that IT MAP, IT RISK and the IT LINK reduce audit fees because 
improved IT Controls scoping reduces the need for additional work in scoping by external 
auditors.  
In this study, IT Controls segregation of duties is the number of duties actually assigned 
to a different department divided by the number of duties that could be assigned to a different 
department (3 = IT Controls responsibility, test execution and remediation). We predict that the 
segregation of duties, as a principle of auditing, reducess audit fees. However, considering the 
requirement for IT skills this may not necessarily be the case. 
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IT Controls framework compliance is measured with the inverse of the cross-sectional 
Euclidean distance between the number of processes or objectives and this number as defined 
by frameworks. A firm is compliant if it uses a number of IT Controls processes and objectives 
similar to the number suggested by frameworks. These frameworks, after a general description 
of principles, focus in the classification of the typology of IT processes that firms need to 
control, independently of other factors, and break each process down into objectives. They thus 
lay down a fixed number of processes/objectives, which take account of company complexity 
in different ways. COSO defines a fixed number of processes (four), and supplies different 
levels of description for complex or less complex environments. COBIT for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act takes into account the complexity and characteristics of different companies by making a 
selection from the entire range of COBIT (Appendix C in COBIT for Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The 
IT Controls framework compliance is the COBIT compliance in Model 1 and the COSO for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance in Model 2 (Tables 5 – 6). We proxy the more complex IT 
environment with the financial industry and the less complex with the manufacturing and 
service industries, and we predict that: compliance with COSO report decreases audit fees in 
the manufacturing and service industries where less complex companies tend to need an 
aggregate level of classification (few general processes); and compliance with COBIT for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act decreases audit fees in the financial industry where more complex firms 
tend to use a disaggregate level of classification (higher stratification of the processes). 
As regards  control variables, audit fees regression models use test variables of interest 
concerning internal control plus an additional set of variables to control for general cross-
sectional differences in factors that affect fees (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; 
Francis and Simon, 1987; Chan et al., 1993; Craswell et al., 1995; Simunic and Stein, 1996; 
Collier and Gregory, 1996; Hay et al., 2006; Francis et al. 2005; Choi et al., 2010; DeFond et 
al., 2000; Whisenant et al., 2003; Basioudis and Francis 2007; Jiang and Wu, 2009). We include 
the following control variables: SIZE, LOSS, ROI, DE, CATA, QUICK, FOREIGN, 
SEGMENTS, MARKET CAPITALIZATION, BIG4, FIRM ROTATION, PARTNER 
ROTATION, AUDIT OPINION, NON-AUDIT FEES (Table 1). The natural logs of total assets 
and market capitalization are proxies for client SIZE (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984), LOSS, 
DE and CATA are proxies for client-specific litigation risks borne by auditors (Francis, 1984; 
Hay et al., 2006). We include the number of business SEGMENTS rather than the number of 
subsidiaries, as additional proxy together with FOREIGN, because operationally diversified 
firms may require more complex audits (Simunic, 1980; Francis et al. 2005; Choi et al., 2010). 
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We include BIG4 and AUDIT OPINION variables to capture the fee premium associated with 
being audited by a Big4 audit firm or with the bigger investigative efforts required in where 
there is a going concern issue (DeFond et al., 2000; Choi et al., 2010). Audit opinion in Italy is 
different from that in USA. We select opinions where the auditor is unable to formulate an 
opinion due to going concern issue or where the auditor simply notes an issue on going concern 
(not considered material) in a separate section of the report. Given the findings of prior research, 
higher fees are also associated with higher NON-AUDIT FEES (Whisenant et al., 2003; 
Basioudis and Francis 2007). We expect the coefficients for all the above control variables, 
except ROI, QUICK and FIRM ROTATION, to be positive, since the literature shows that audit 
fees are positively related to client size, client-specific risk factors and client complexity. 
Clients with higher ROI have lower fees because of risk sharing, and clients with higher QUICK 
have lower fees because there is more liquidity. Lower fees are expected due to lowballing 
effects when the auditor changes. Because data is available  for Italy, we are also able to include 
PARTNER ROTATION. We perform the regressions separately for the manufacturing and 
service and the financial INDUSTRIES to control for differences across them (Francis et al., 
2005; Basioudis and Francis 2007). 
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Table 1 – Definition of Variables 
Dependent variable  
AUDIT FEES Natural log of Audit Fees  
Independent Internal Control Variables 
IT MAP 
 
Indicator variable, 1 = if companies have a matrix that includes the list and the description 
of financial applications and IT infrastructure services, 0 = otherwise 
IT RISK Indicator variable, 1 = if companies evaluate the likelihood and the impact of the 
misstatement that one IT element could have on the financial reporting, 0 = otherwise 
IT LINK  Indicator variable, 1 = if companies have an activity that understands if the IT elements 
support the business, 0 = otherwise 
IT CONTROLS 
SEGREGATION 
OF DUTIES  
The number of duties actually assigned to a different department divided by the number 
of duties that could be assigned to a different department (3 = IT CONTROLS 
RESPONSIBILITY, TEST EXECUTION, REMEDIATION) 
#duties assigned to different department by questionnaire
3
 
 
(we thank the anonymous referee for the suggestion of the operalization of this variable) 
COSO 
COMPLIANCE 
 
 
 
the inverse of the cross-sectional Euclidean distance between the number of processes 
from the questionnaire and this number as defined by COSO defined in the principle 
n°14 (4). We standardize the indicator putting +1 at the denominator. 
1
1 + √(#processes by questionnaire – 4)2
 
 
COBIT 
COMPLIANCE 
 
the inverse of the cross-sectional Euclidean distance between the number of processes 
(12) and objectives (80) from the questionnaire and this number as defined by COBIT 
for SARBANES-OXLEYACT in the APPENDIX C. We standardize the indicator 
putting +1 at the denominator. 
1
1 +  √(#processes by questionnaire – 12)2 + √(#objectives by questionnaire – 80)2 
 
Independent Control Variables  
SIZE Natural log of total assets 
LOSS Indicator variable, 1 = negative earning, 0 = otherwise 
ROI Ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets 
DE Ratio of long term debt to total assets 
CATA Ratio of current assets to total assets 
QUICK Ratio of current assets (less inventory) to current liabilities 
FOREIGN Indicator variable, 1=Presence of foreign currency translation in the other 
comprehensive income, 0=otherwise 
SEGMENTS Number of operating segments 
CAPITALIZATION 1 = Index FTSE Italy Micro Cap 
2 = Index FTSE Italy Small Cap  
3 = Index FTSE Italy Mid Cap 
4 = Index FTSE Italy Mib 
BIG4 Indicator variable, 1= if the auditor is D&T, KPMG, E&Y or PWC, 0=otherwise 
FIRM ROTATION Indicator variable, 1=voluntary auditor rotation, 0=otherwise 
PARTNER ROTATION Indicator variable, 1=partner rotation, 0=otherwise 
AUDIT OPINION Indicator variable, 1=going concern problem where the auditor is unable to 
formulate an opinion or where the auditor simply notes the problem (not 
considered material) in a separate section of the report (clean opinion with 
emphasis on matter paragraph)., 0=otherwise 
NON-AUDIT FEES Natural log of non-audit fees paid to the auditor 
All the continuous variables are in thousands of Euro and are winsorized at 1% 
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3.2. Interviews, questionnaire and database 
 
We collected private data on IT Controls through interviews and questionnaires.   
We performed 6 interviews on 2 companies from each industry (the banking, the 
insurance and the manufacturing and service industries), because different industries have 
different IT systems and different internal control systems. Moreover, size (total assets) can 
influence the evaluation process because larger firms have more resources and more controls. 
We thus selected one firm from the top and one firm from the bottom quartile of the total assets 
for each industry. Interviews were carried out during the period May – August 2010. We 
conducted exploratory interviews with a general open question: “How do you evaluate the IT 
Controls?” Face-to-face interviews of chief financial officer or financial staff were carried out 
by two professors and a Ph.D. student.  Each interview lasted about 3 hours because after 
answering the first general question, firms  often showed us their IT control system and the 
details of controls and the procedures of the audit cycle. The information collected was mainly 
used to draw up a questionnaire and interpret responses to it. We prepared the questionnaire 
together with external auditors from one of the Big4. We discussed and selected instruments 
for each construct based on frameworks. External auditors made a key contribution in ensuring 
language would be comprehensible for the target companies. We used yes/no questions, 
multiple choice about the procedures implemented for the evaluation process and open 
questions asking the number of processes and objectives of controls, with none of the questions 
requiring discretionary judgment. Appendix A shows the questions used in this research and 
their relation with the variables defined for the regression models.  
The questionnaire was next tested on three firms from the target population: a bank, an 
insurance firm and a manufacturing firm. On the basis of their responses and comments, the 
questionnaire, the study design and the measurement of some constructs were slightly adapted.   
The questionnaire focused on evaluating the year 2010 and was distributed by email in 
2011. The distribution procedure involved sending a survey package containing the 
questionnaire and a covering email underlining the importance of the research and encouraging 
firms to reply.   In order to increase the response rate, companies which had not yet responded 
were contacted by phone after three weeks.  
We opted to make the questionnaire confidential, i.e. although the names of respondent 
companies are known to us they are not disclosed here and results are shown only in aggregate 
form. We were thus able to link the data collected by questionnaires with other sources. Finally, 
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we hand-collected data from the consolidated annual reports for firms using IFRS, from 
company web sites and the website of the Borsa Italiana, the Italian Stock Exchange. 
  
3.3. Sample 
 
For this research, the population is the 255 Italian companies listed on the  Milan Stock 
Exchange which are explicitly targeted at monitoring and assuring compliance with Law 
262/2005.  
We sent the questionnaire to 122 companies which agreed to take part. We received 109 
answers (response rate: 89%; 43% of the population). Among respondents, 50 firms operate an 
IT Controls evaluation process. This sample thus represents nearly 20% of the population (50 
of 255). We performed the analyses for the two samples, the full sample (109) and the sample 
of companies that implement IT Controls evaluation (50). 
For the full sample we obtained 84 observations for the manufacturing and service 
industries and 25 observations for the financial industry. For the sample implementing IT 
Controls evaluation, we obtained 31 observations for the manufacturing and service industries 
and 19 observations for the financial industry (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 – Sample Selection 
 Total 
Manufacturing 
and service  
industry 
Finance 
industry 
Panel A – Full sample     
Total number of companies listed on the Milan 
Stock Exchange in 2010 
255 219 36 
Less companies not willing to supply information 
requested  
-133 -127 -6 
Total  companies to whom  questionnaire sent 122 92 30 
Less companies not answering questionnaire 
(Response rate: 89%; 43% of the population) 
-13 -8 -5 
Total number of companies answering 
questionnaire 
109 84 25 
 
Panel B – Sample with an IT Controls evaluation 
   
Number of companies from Panel A 109 84 25 
Less number of companies without an IT Controls 
evaluation process 
-59 -53 -6 
Total number of companies with an IT Controls 
evaluation process 
(about 20% of the population) 
50 31 19 
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4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the internal control variables and the control 
variables for the full sample and for the sample of companies implementing an IT Controls 
evaluation process. 
In the full sample, few companies implement IT Controls scoping (22.6-36% map, 19-
24% risk and 26.2-36% link), few carry out IT Controls segregation of duties (17.5-25.4%) and 
few show IT Controls framework compliance (1.2-1.4% COBIT, 23.4-35.1% COSO). Overall, 
these statistics point to a weakness in IT Controls among firms in Italy. 
In the sample of firms implementing IT Controls evaluation processes, the most critical 
points are risk assessment (51.6-31.6%) and IT Controls segregation of duties (47.4-33.4%). 
Although audit guidelines underline the importance of risk assessment and the segregation of 
duties, about 50-70% of companies in our sample do not respect these requirements. 
Compliance with COSO is higher than compliance with COBIT, showing that companies prefer 
to set up lower numbers of processes. However, companies making IT Controls evaluation seem 
to have understood the importance of the link between IT and business (71-47.4%). 
Comparing different industries, in the full sample, IT Controls scoping and IT Controls 
segregation of duties are more developed in the financial industry than in the manufacturing 
and service industries, but the manufacturing and service companies that have implemented IT 
Controls evaluation have built up better IT Controls scoping and IT Controls segregation of 
duties. COSO compliance is more widely observed in the financial industry. 
Financial statement variables show that the sample carrying out IT Controls evaluation 
presents smaller losses (10.5/35.5% versus 37.8/37.9%) and higher ROI (3.1/0.9% versus 0.7/-
3.1%). This sample also presents fewer audit opinions with going concern issues (9.7/0% versus  
19/8%). The DE, CATA and QUICK indices in our sample are consistent with those found in 
USA research, which are approximately 26.3/16.1%; 43.6/43.5% and 1.179/1.731 respectively 
(Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt and Wang, 2010). 
All our financial firms use one of the Big4, and for financial firms using IT Controls 
evaluation there were no audit opinions with going concern issues. These variables were thus 
dropped in the regressions. Their size and capitalization show that banks and insurance 
companies are larger than manufacturing and service companies (17.286/14.926 versus 
14.072/12.596; 3.211/3.160 versus 2.516/2.488 respectively). On the other hand however, 
manufacturing and service companies have higher levels of internationalization than banks and 
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insurance firms (foreign: 61.3/52.4% versus 31.6/28%). The level of diversification (number of 
segments) is similar across industries and samples (mean: 3-4).   
In the year 2010 , the sample making IT Controls evaluation shows higher rotation of 
audit firms than the full sample (16.1/10.5% versus 13.1/12%) while for the financial industry 
this rotation is lower than for the manufacturing and service industries. Partner rotation shows 
similar results; it is higher for the full sample (22.6/10.5% versus  26.2/16%) and for the 
manufacturing and service industries. 
We performed a t-test for the mean difference between the two samples and the 
population (untabulated). Our samples are not significantly different from the population in 
terms of liquidity, loss for manufacturing and service companies. The financial industry is not 
different from the population in terms of profitability.  
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics  
 Full sample from questionnaire Sample with an ITC evaluation 
 Manufacturing and service  n=84 Finance n=25 Manufacturing and service n=31 Finance n=19 
 Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Min Max 
Internal Control 
Variables                 
IT MAP 0.226 0.421 0.000 1.000 0.360 0.490 0.000 1.000 0.613 0.495 0.000 1.000 0.474 0.513 0.000 1.000 
IT RISK 0.190 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.240 0.436 0.000 1.000 0.516 0.508 0.000 1.000 0.316 0.478 0.000 1.000 
IT LINK 0.262 0.442 0.000 1.000 0.360 0.490 0.000 1.000 0.710 0.461 0.000 1.000 0.474 0.513 0.000 1.000 
IT CONTROLS 
SEGREGATION 
OF DUTIES 0.175 0.296 0.000 1.000 0.254 0.294 0.000 0.670 0.474 0.309 0.000 1.000 0.334 0.295 0.000 0.670 
COBIT 
COMPLIANCE 0.012 0.004 0.011 0.045 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.036 0.014 0.007 0.011 0.045 0.015 0.007 0.001 0.036 
COSO 
COMPLIANCE 
 0.234 0.158 0.077 1.000 0.351 0.343 0.032 1.000 0.293 0.251 0.077 1.000 0.399 0.383 0.032 1.000 
Control Variables                 
SIZE 12.596 1.990 6.661 18.180 14.926 3.152 8.481 18.722 14.072 2.044 10.595 18.112 17.286 1.317 14.261 18.722 
LOSS 0.379 0.486 0.000 1.000 0.378 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.355 0.486 0.000 1.000 0.105 0.315 0.000 1.000 
ROI 0.007 0.105 -0.558 0.259 -0.031 0.127 -0.558 0.071 0.031 0.082 -0.201 0.211 0.009 0.029 -0.066 0.071 
DE 0.161 0.161 0.000 0.630 . . . . 0.263 0.160 0.000 0.630 . . . . 
CATA 0.435 0.242 0.019 0.935 . . . . 0.436 0.218 0.059 0.825 . . . . 
QUICK 1.731 3.207 0.127 31.432 . . . . 1.179 0.633 0.214 3.315 . . . . 
FOREIGN 0.524 0.502 0.000 1.000 0.280 0.458 0.000 1.000 0.613 0.495 0.000 1.000 0.316 0.478 0.000 1.000 
SEGMENTS 3.095 1.986 0.000 10.000 3.800 1.528 1.000 7.000 2.903 2.103 0.000 8.000 4.105 1.487 1.000 7.000 
CAPITALIZAZION 2.488 0.885 1.000 4.000 3.160 0.987 1.000 4.000 2.516 0.962 1.000 4.000 3.211 1.032 1.000 4.000 
BIG 4 0.940 0.238 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.968 0.180 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FIRM ROTATION 0.131 0.339 0.000 1.000 0.120 0.332 0.000 1.000 0.161 0.374 0.000 1.000 0.105 0.315 0.000 1.000 
PARTNER 
ROTATION 0.262 0.442 0.000 1.000 0.160 0.374 0.000 1.000 0.226 0.425 0.000 1.000 0.105 0.315 0.000 1.000 
AUDIT OPINION 0.190 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.080 0.277 0.000 1.000 0.097 0.301 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NON AUDIT FEE 3.596 2.192 0.000 8.081 4.625 2.898 0.000 8.348 3.512 2.530 0.000 8.081 5.608 2.370 0.000 8.348 
AUDIT FEE 5.860 1.154 3.555 9.807 6.329 1.700 2.996 9.782 6.107 1.452 3.555 9.807 6.833 1.325 4.220 9.782 
 t-test is the test for the mean difference between each group and the population. ***indicates significance at the 0.01 level or better, **indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better, *indicates significance at 
the 0.10 level or better. 
 
The correlation matrix (Table 4) shows that audit fees are significantly correlated with 
the variables of interest. We thus investigated in regressions the relations between the internal 
control variables of interest and the audit fees controlling for factors that can influence audit 
fees (control variables). 
Table 4 shows a positive correlation between Big4 and audit fees, and a negative 
correlation between audit opinions and audit fees. This is validity confirmation of the audit fees 
proxy because it is consistent with USA research.  The correlation matrix shows a significantly 
high Pearson correlation (over 50%) coefficient between audit fees and non-audit fees, 
supporting the positive correlation identified in the literature. There is also, as in the literature, 
a high correlation (over 50%) between audit fees and market capitalization and client size.  
The three components of IT Controls scoping quality are positively and significantly 
correlated, as validity confirmation that they measure a similar concept. However their 
individual Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) in the regressions are about 2 and do not show 
problems of multicollinearity as they are below the conventionary  acceptable level. 
Other high significant correlations occur between ROI, the presence of loss and the 
presence of going-concern opinions; size, capitalization and non-audit fees. Because of these 
correlations, as shown in the sensitivity analysis, one variable was dropped for each of these 
correlations. The dropped variable was selected on the basis of the highest individual VIF (over 
10). 
Spearman correlations give rise to similar considerations (untabulated). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 AUDIT FEES 1.000                     
2 IT MAP 
0.379 1.000                    
3 IT RISK 
0.307 0.594 1.000                   
4 IT LINK 
0.182 0.700 0.646 1.000                  
5 IT CONTROLS 
SEGREGATION OF 
DUTIES 0.277 0.520 0.501 0.578 1.000                 
6 COBIT COMPLIANCE 
0.401 0.454 0.418 0.334 0.325 1.000                
7 COSO COMPLIANCE 
0.036 0.119 -0.020 0.117 0.319 0.149 1.000               
8 SIZE 
0.687 0.418 0.338 0.360 0.363 0.350 0.148 1.000              
9 LOSS 
-0.334 -0.166 -0.128 -0.163 0.001 -0.147 -0.013 -0.345 1.000             
10 ROI 
0.174 0.029 0.009 0.018 -0.096 0.048 -0.060 0.224 -0.518 1.000            
11 DE 
0.096 0.201 0.093 0.148 0.100 0.005 0.082 0.387 0.014 0.014 1.000           
12 CATA 
0.046 -0.185 -0.169 -0.265 -0.199 -0.071 -0.062 -0.264 -0.059 0.078 -0.320 1.000          
13 QUICK 
-0.040 0.014 0.038 -0.023 -0.069 -0.009 -0.027 -0.025 0.075 -0.085 -0.094 0.055 1.000         
14 FOREIGN 
0.283 0.164 0.124 0.061 0.074 0.152 -0.140 0.084 0.009 0.023 0.058 0.192 -0.021 1.000        
15 SEGMENTS 
0.371 0.064 0.064 -0.032 0.027 0.082 -0.056 0.447 -0.271 0.120 0.162 -0.166 -0.045 0.018 1.000       
16 CAPITALIZATION 
0.604 0.268 0.167 0.110 0.161 0.250 -0.027 0.596 -0.335 0.055 0.063 -0.060 0.040 0.102 0.292 1.000      
17 BIG 4 
0.145 0.129 0.001 0.041 0.044 0.070 0.062 0.172 -0.116 0.123 0.001 -0.080 0.094 0.030 0.168 0.149 1.000     
18 FIRM ROTATION 
-0.014 0.088 -0.125 0.062 0.028 0.133 0.018 -0.063 0.122 -0.001 0.113 -0.162 -0.146 -0.085 0.165 -0.058 -0.047 1.000    
19 PARTNER ROTATION 
-0.010 0.016 -0.174 -0.019 -0.049 0.042 -0.032 -0.079 0.178 -0.069 0.082 -0.067 0.099 -0.093 0.185 -0.084 -0.083 0.686 1.000   
20 NON-AUDIT FEE 
0.576 0.221 0.157 0.075 0.117 0.127 0.175 0.526 -0.229 0.133 0.056 -0.073 0.128 0.169 0.228 0.326 0.310 -0.079 -0.147 1.000  
21 AUDIT OPINION 
-0.147 -0.205 -0.224 -0.280 -0.151 -0.139 -0.034 -0.345 0.556 -0.330 0.130 -0.025 -0.173 0.128 -0.099 -0.303 -0.139 0.051 -0.017 -0.115 1.000 
Note: The lower left-hand portion of the table presents Pearson correlation.  Bold text indicates significance at the 0.01 level or better. See Table 1 for definition of variables. 
 5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
The model verifies the relationship between audit fees and IT Controls quality, 
measured with variables related to IT scoping (IT map, IT risk, IT link) IT Controls 
segregation of duties, IT Controls framework compliance. The results are presented for the 
full sample and for the sample of firms implementing IT Controls evaluation. They are shown 
separately for manufacturing and service industries and the financial industry (Table 5). The 
results are shown for the two samples.  
 
Previous research based on the production function view of audit fees has provided a 
great deal of insight into the determinants of audit fees. However, Hay et al. (2006) highlight 
some anomalies in audit fee models, possibly due to low-power tests or assumptions that 
underlie the production view of audits. We show however that our model has a high power in 
testing (Adjusted R2) due to the inclusion of internal control variables related to IT Controls 
quality, which reduces the problem of the omitted variables, as suggested by Hay et al. (2006). 
We test this in two ways: with the overall exclusion of our explorative variables and with the 
omitted variable test. In the first test we assess whether the Adjusted R2 increases from the 
regressions with only control variables to regressions with both control variables and 
explorative variables. For example in the finance industry, we find that the Adjusted R2 
increases from 81.2% to 89.6% in the full sample, from 81.2% to 86.9% in the sample with IT 
Controls evaluation (untabulated). Adjusted R2 increase because including IT Controls quality 
variables reduces the problem of the omitted variables, as suggested by Hay et al. (2006). In 
the second test, we run the omitted variable test twice, for regressions with only control 
variables and for regressions with both control variables and explorative variables. We find 
that the omitted variable tests for the regressions with only control variables are significant 
under the 1% level. This result means that we reject the hypothesis that the model has no 
omitted variables. The inclusion of explorative variables should reduce this problem; in fact 
when they are included, the omitted variable test is no longer significant for the full sample or 
for the sample with IT Controls evaluation in finance industry. In comparison with the 
previous findings on fee determinants (Hay et al., 2006), we thus make the new finding that 
the functioning of internal control systems related to IT Controls in specific companies is an 
important determinant of audit fees. 
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The results provide useful indications on the reduction of audit fees linked to IT 
Controls scoping quality. They show that the IT MAP reduces the audit fees in the financial 
industry and that the IT LINK reduces the audit fees in the manufacturing and service 
industries. A possible explanation is that banks and insurance firms benefit more from the 
activity of creating a matrix with a list and a description of all the elements because they are 
more complex and mapping requires a major effort. In manufacturing and service companies, 
on the other hand, the link between IT and the business reduces the audit fees, a finding which 
is consistent with prior research (Chan et al. 1998; Kearns and Lederer, 2000; Tallon et al., 
2000; Cragg et al., 2002; Tallon, 2003; Avison et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2006; Sabherwal and 
Chan 2001) which finds that the business-IT alignment increases business performance in 
these industries. The activity of IT MAP is inefficient for manufacturing and service industries 
because it increases audit fees. These results show how an efficient IT Control scoping lowers 
audit fees by releasing auditors from the need to perform additional tests.  
 
The results indicate that IT Controls segregation of duties reduces audit fees in the 
financial industry. Consistent with the literature (Ashton, 1974; Hamilton and Wright, 1982; 
Nichols, 1987; Ashton et al., 1991; Malguzzi, 2007; Bencini et al., 2008; Servato, 2008; 
Bencini and Filippini, 2009) we find that the segregation of duties is a good principle leading 
to high quality ICFR, and our study emphasizes that it also has a positive influence on IT 
Controls quality. Because of the requirement for highly trained skills in the field of IT, the 
segregation of duties in many cases means the concentration of two duties (responsibility and 
remediation) and the separation of testing (IFAC, 1995; Hermanson et al., 2000; Cannon and 
Crowe, 2004; McCausland, 2004; Norman et al., 2009). Consistently with this, excessive 
segregation of duties in the manufacturing and service industries is not efficient and in fact 
increases audit fees. Audit fees decrease when IT Controls quality increases, but only when 
IT Controls assignment of duties is efficient. The issue here is that the efficient assignment of 
duties and responsibilities to Internal Audit, IT or other departments, is different between 
industries. 
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The results show that in the manufacturing and service industries, IT Controls 
framework compliance with COSO framework (efficient definition of the number of processes 
and objectives) decreases audit fees. Consistent with Linkhous (2008) and Wallace et al. 
(2011), companies were found to use the COSO framework for IT Controls. This framework, 
developed in the USA, could potentially be used as a high quality benchmark in Italy too. In 
the manufacturing and services industries because the smaller size of companies, their lower 
complexity and their greater difficulties in obtaining human and financial resources lead to the 
concentration of processes and the simplification of the IT system. In these industries, IT 
Controls quality is best obtained  with a non specialized IT framework, such as COSO, which 
is simpler than COBIT for Sarbanes-Oxley Act and more suitable for less complex activities 
(Azzali and Mazza, 2013). COBIT is less effective, maybe because of the high presence of 
outsourcing in IT Controls (Mazza et al. 2014). Contrary to our expectation, COBIT is not yet 
a framework that improves IT Controls quality in financial industry. This could be due to the 
inefficient implementation of COBIT in the early years of its voluntary use by Italian 
companies.  
 
The control variables significant at least at 5% in our models are: SIZE, LOSS, CATA, 
QUICK, MARKET CAPITALIZATION, PARTNER ROTATION, AUDIT OPINION, 
NON-AUDIT FEES. The variables from the financial statement and company prices show 
that client size, proxied by the log of total assets and market capitalization, is positively related 
to audit fees because more effort and resources are required to audit bigger companies . This 
result is consistent with the literature (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984). The results show a 
positive relation between audit fees and CATA and a negative relation with QUICK in 
manufacturing and service companies. Because of the higher risk of litigation related to CATA 
(Francis, 1984; Hay et al., 2006), this variable shows a direct relation to audit fees. Companies 
with higher QUICK have lower audit fees because they have greater liquidity. The control 
variables on external audit show, consistent with prior research, that higher audit fees are 
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associated with higher non-audit fees (Whisenant et al., 2003; Basioudis and Francis 2007). 
Our results on specifically Italian partner rotation show a positive relation with audit fees: the 
new partner has to spend more time and effort in getting to know the client. There is no partner 
rotation for the 19 banks or insurance firms in 2010, so this has been dropped from this 
regression. We identify a positive relationship with audit opinions and audit fees. This result 
is consistent with the literature, which has previously identified a fee premium associated with 
the greater effort involved in giving an opinion with an issue in going concern (DeFond et al., 
2000; Choi et al., 2010). 
 
These results can be interpreted in the light of the ICFR regulation in Italy. Italian 
legislation, with Article 154bis (Law 262/2005)2 was passed in 2005 and came into force in 
the second half of 2007. It aims to protect shareholders and stakeholders from fraudulent 
corporate practices and accounting errors. It requires the evaluation of ICFR and their 
certification only by insiders (without the certification by the external auditors), and the 
responsibility for ICFR is often given to the chief financial officer by the Italian listed firms. 
This evaluation increases sensitiveness to ICFR, including IT Controls, and it brings benefits, 
such as the reduction of audit fees.  
Nevertheless Italian legislation is less stringent than SOX and it is known as “Light 
SOX”, it leads to the reduction of audit fees partly thanks to the voluntary adoption of USA 
frameworks. It would be interesting to compare findings for Italy with results from other 
countries in order to identify their relevance and applicability in legal systems outside Italy. 
 
 
  
                                                 
2 This article was an amendment of “Testo Unico della Finanza” - the code which regulates the financial market 
(CONSOB, 2010 –CONSOB is the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa similar to the USA 
Security Exchange Commission - SEC). 
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Table 5 - Regression Results 
 
  Full sample from questionnaire Sample with an IT Controls evaluation 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
Manufacturing and 
service Industries 
Finance Industry 
Manufacturing and 
service Industries 
Finance Industry 
 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 
IT MAP - 0.700 0.810    -1.471 -1.097    0.927 0.800    -1.773 -1.245 
  (0.602) (0.569)    (0.446)*** (0.471)**  (1.272) (1.057)    (0.366)*** (0.709) 
IT RISK - 0.521 0.659    0.0813 0.774    0.391 0.539    0.0995 0.693 
  (0.459) (0.429)    (0.355) (0.535)    (0.922) (0.787)    (0.468) (0.577) 
IT LINK - -0.949 -1.161    0.160 0.415    -0.895 -0.911    0.417 0.544 
  (0.645) (0.623)*   (0.433) (0.535)    (1.630) (1.419)    (0.338) (0.633) 
IT CONTROLS 
SEGREGATION 
OF DUTIES 
- 0.401 0.880    -1.310 -1.489    1.028 1.762    -2.034 -1.807 
 
(0.442) (0.417)**  (0.556)** (0.497)**  (0.823) (0.736)**  (0.616)** (0.996) 
COBIT 
COMPLIANCE 
- 35.20                 81.42                 15.34                    77.58  
 (26.41)                 (24.28)***                 (44.78)                    (23.74)**  
COSO 
COMPLIANCE 
-  -1.467     1.057     -2.070     0.624 
  (0.545)*** (0.524)*    (0.777)**   (0.747) 
SIZE + 0.203 0.219    0.322 0.293    0.211 0.312    0.991 0.782 
  (0.165) (0.146)    (0.138)** (0.108)**  (0.423) (0.317)    (0.321)** (0.602) 
LOSS + -0.146 -0.253    0.736 0.795    -0.140 -0.545    3.772 3.219 
  (0.305) (0.301)    (0.669) (0.539)    (0.817) (0.714)    (1.249)** (2.566) 
ROI - 0.663 0.600    0.444 0.772    0.151 -0.483    39.69 31.21 
  (1.657) (1.619)    (0.841) (0.947)    (5.139) (4.836)    (15.98)* (29.73) 
DE + 0.443 0.733      1.252 2.472      
  (0.757) (0.743)      (1.554) (1.238)*     
CATA + 1.364 1.633      3.602 4.331      
  (0.459)*** (0.433)***  (2.018) (1.676)**    
QUICK - -0.141 -0.151      -0.401 -0.206      
  (0.0653)** (0.0616)**   (0.367) (0.293)      
FOREIGN + 0.130 0.0571    -0.723 -0.109    0.159 -0.0895    -0.604 -0.104 
  (0.189) (0.184)    (0.472) (0.563)    (0.459) (0.431)    (0.407) (0.650) 
SEGMENTS + 0.0276 0.00522    0.146 0.209    0.0618 -0.0495    0.141 0.167 
  (0.0474) (0.0439)    (0.146) (0.124)    (0.202) (0.149)    (0.187) (0.221) 
CAPITALIZ. + 0.387 0.372    1.000 1.016    0.542 0.368    0.621 0.649 
  (0.183)** (0.171)**  (0.244)*** (0.278)*** (0.617) (0.424)    (0.283)* (0.486) 
BIG 4 + -0.0469 0.0608    . .    0.613 1.146    . . 
  (0.319) (0.313)    . .    (1.040) (1.017)    . . 
FIRM 
ROTATION 
- -0.257 -0.185    0.450 0.195    0.984 1.597    -0.761 -0.835 
 (0.289) (0.263)    (0.683) (0.536)    (1.447) (0.937)    (0.317)* (0.508) 
PARTNER 
ROTATION 
 0.599 0.646    -0.824 -0.697    -0.790 -0.959    . . 
 (0.268)** (0.268)**  (0.453) (0.425)    (1.118) (0.740)    . . 
AUDIT 
OPINION 
+ 0.401 0.502    1.718 1.851    -0.697 -0.0363    . . 
 (0.253) (0.245)**  (0.429)*** (0.401)*** (1.434) (1.357)    . . 
NON AUDIT 
FEE 
+ 0.126 0.131    0.451 0.364    0.113 0.127    0.411 0.336 
 (0.0631)* (0.0561)**  (0.108)*** (0.102)*** (0.158) (0.145)    (0.105)** (0.147)* 
CONSTANT  0.384 0.693    -5.041 -4.246    -1.624 -3.038    -15.52 -11.38 
  (1.626) (1.539)    (2.268)* (1.987)*   (4.602) (3.223)    (4.707)** (8.964) 
MEAN VIF  2.67 2.65 4.22 4.17 4.26 4.03 6.23 7.78 
Adjusted R2  0.620 0.644   0.896 0.856    0.301 0.517    0.869 0.645 
Observations  84 84    25 25    31 31    19 19 
Note: this table presents the robust standard error in parentheses for the OLS regression ***indicates significance at the 0.01 
level or better, **indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better, *indicates significance at the 0.10 level or better. 
The IT Controls FRAMEWORK COMPLIANCE is the COBIT COMPLIANCE in Model 1 and the COSO for Sarbanes-
Oxley Act COMPLIANCE in Model 2. 
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6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
We perform two sensitivity tests.  
The mean VIF in Table 5 shows that there may be problems of multi-collinearity (mean 
VIF about 4.03 to 7.78); in the first sensitivity test (untabulated) we thus drop the variable 
with the highest VIF from the regression. For the full sample in finance industry, we drop the 
size variable, and re-running the regression, the mean VIF becomes 2.85 for Model 1 and 2.81 
for Model 2. For the sample with an IT Controls evaluation in manufacturing and service 
industries, we drop partner rotation, and the mean VIF becomes 3.55 for Model 1 and 3.18 for 
Model 2. In the finance industry we drop ROI, and the mean VIF becomes 3.06 for Model 1 
and 2.97 for Model 2. However all the variables dropped are control variables,  and in the re-
run  regressions the explanatory variables of interest have the same sign. This supports 
previous results. 
 
In the second sensitivity test (Table 6), we assume that the evaluation procedures of IT 
Controls do not change in the short term, given that they require high investment and a long 
training process to be implemented. We choose as short term a 3 year period and we collect 
financial data for one year before and one year after 2010. Then, we average the continuous 
variables for the three years (2009/2010/2011) and we match them with the questionnaire data. 
The results for the internal control variables are consistent (Table 6). The three years period is 
homogeneous with respect to the financial context of crisis. The Adjusted R2 is higher and the 
mean VIF does not show multi-collinearity. 
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Table 6– Sensitivity analysis – Mean 2009-2010-2011 
 
  Full sample from questionnaire Sample with an IT Controls evaluation 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
Manufacturing and 
service Industries 
Finance Industry 
Manufacturing and 
service Industries 
Finance Industry 
 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 
IT MAP - 0.604 0.751    -1.271 -0.892    0.890 0.934    -1.253 -0.910    
  (0.303)** (0.300)**  (0.178)*** (0.216)*** (0.405)** (0.382)**  (0.222)*** (0.260)*** 
IT RISK - 0.176 0.229    0.358 1.018    0.223 0.223    0.406 1.190    
  (0.210) (0.206)    (0.164)** (0.197)*** (0.240) (0.225)    (0.169)** (0.213)*** 
IT LINK - -0.766 -0.927    -0.253 -0.102    -1.137 -1.067    -0.224 0.00206    
  (0.303)** (0.308)*** (0.168) (0.191)    (0.491)** (0.450)**  (0.197) (0.224)    
IT CONTROLS 
SEGREGATION 
OF DUTIES 
- 0.251 0.670    -0.687 -0.964    0.312 0.969    -0.533 -0.921    
 
(0.229) (0.228)*** (0.237)*** (0.236)*** (0.376) (0.346)*** (0.327) (0.355)**  
COBIT 
COMPLIANCE 
- 32.39                 69.59                 34.01                 71.30                 
 (10.82)***                 (11.34)***                 (11.22)***                 (10.24)***                 
COSO 
COMPLIANCE 
-  -1.256     1.012     -1.505     1.245    
  (0.233)*** (0.198)*** (0.285)*** (0.231)*** 
SIZE + 0.298 0.310    0.273 0.281    0.366 0.362    0.286 0.236    
  
(0.0680)**
* 
(0.0614)**
* 
(0.0486)**
* 
(0.0494)**
* (0.129)*** (0.116)*** (0.103)*** (0.102)**  
LOSS + 0.179 0.141    -0.121 0.0427    0.123 -0.00235    -0.144 -0.00673    
  (0.126) (0.124)    (0.166) (0.168)    (0.284) (0.267)    (0.229) (0.199)    
ROI - -0.374 -0.435    -0.153 0.0501    -7.341 -6.871    -2.138 -7.699    
  (0.806) (0.845)    (0.659) (0.744)    (2.930)** (2.734)**  (4.450) (3.948)*   
DE + -0.210 -0.130      0.382 0.443      
  (0.539) (0.513)      (0.710) (0.706)      
CATA + 1.133 1.370      2.296 3.299      
  (0.253)*** (0.247)***  (0.532)*** (0.546)***  
QUICK - -0.00913 -0.0108      -0.000287 -0.00711     
  
(0.0029)**
* (0.0029)***  (0.00553) (0.00509)     
FOREIGN + 0.158 0.0885    -0.251 0.194    0.0605 -0.0554    -0.324 0.0766    
  (0.0960) (0.0931)    (0.177) (0.178)    (0.209) (0.196)    (0.178)* (0.190)    
SEGMENTS + 0.0508 0.0406    -0.0198 0.0215    0.0409 0.000267    -0.0434 0.0108    
  (0.0218)** (0.0201)**  (0.0544) (0.0595)    (0.0513) (0.0459)    (0.0691) (0.0689)    
CAPITALIZ. + 0.292 0.280    0.767 0.766    0.253 0.296    0.758 0.853    
  
(0.0863)**
* 
(0.0822)**
* 
(0.0748)**
* 
(0.0798)**
* (0.216) (0.185)    
(0.0956)**
* (0.111)*** 
BIG 4 + -0.0328 0.0115    . .    -0.220 0.524    . .    
  (0.159) (0.159)    . .    (0.501) (0.462)    . .    
FIRM 
ROTATION 
- -0.253 -0.243    -0.288 -0.661    -0.299 -0.138    -0.398 -0.806    
 (0.154) (0.152)    (0.299) (0.280)**  (0.280) (0.270)    (0.341) (0.246)*** 
PARTNER 
ROTATION 
 0.0764 0.105    0.183 0.357    0.0727 0.0506    0.216 0.400    
 (0.0984) (0.0926)    (0.129) (0.154)**  (0.192) (0.178)    (0.175) (0.210)*   
AUDIT 
OPINION 
+ 0.0171 0.0886    1.301 1.401    -1.212 -0.914    . .    
 (0.125) (0.130)    (0.258)*** (0.293)*** (0.467)** (0.481)*   . .    
NON AUDIT 
FEE 
+ 0.122 .    0.349 .    0.0951 .    0.355 .    
 
(0.0358)**
* .    
(0.0437)**
* .    (0.0717) .    
(0.0617)**
* .    
CONSTANT  -0.389 -0.0754    -2.203 -1.878    -1.250 -1.970    -2.432 -1.419    
  (0.638) (0.596)    (0.605)*** (0.565)*** (1.388) (1.253)    (1.649) (1.788)    
MEAN VIF  2.23 2.24 2.75 2.76 2.58 2.53 2.75 2.73 
Adjusted R2  0.694 0.707    0.911 0.896    0.694 0.741    0.861 0.855    
Observations  84 84    25 25    31 31    19 19 
Note: this table presents the robust standard error in parentheses for the OLS regression ***indicates significance at the 0.01 level or better, 
**indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better, *indicates significance at the 0.10 level or better. 
The IT Controls FRAMEWORK COMPLIANCE is the COBIT COMPLIANCE in Model 1 and the COSO for Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
COMPLIANCE in Model 2. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
The main contribution of the paper is the finding that high quality of IT Controls 
decreases audit fees. IT Controls quality is explored using IT scoping quality, IT Controls 
segregation of duties and IT Controls framework compliance and these components of ICFR 
are shown to be highly relevant to a reduction in audit fees. 
The results support the hypothesis that audit effort is sensitive to control risk, as a 
specific component of audit risk, and not only to inherent risk as has been found by previous 
literature. The findings were made after the implementation of Law 262/2005 in Italy, which 
indicates that the increased sensitiveness of the audit effort to risk is a benefit of this type of 
regulation. The Italian law thus appears to have an effect similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
in the USA. Our results show that when control risk decreases, because the IT Controls quality 
increases, auditors charge lower audit fees.  
As regards IT scoping quality, IT RISK assessment does not currently significantly 
reduce audit fees, and this may be because it is not fully implemented by listed firms. We find 
that investments in IT scoping quality, specifically, investment in IT MAP for banks and 
insurance firms and investment in IT LINK for manufacturing and service companies, lead to 
a reduction of audit fees. IT Controls segregation of duties decreases audit fees for banks and 
insurance firms but increases them for the manufacturing and service industries. This could be 
because the requirement for high level IT skills is harder for manufacturing and services 
industries to meet. Finally, we suggest the COSO framework be adopted by manufacturing 
and services firms in Italy because compliance with the framework tends to lower audit fees.  
Summarizing, the  most effective factors of IT Controls are IT map and IT segregation 
of duties in the financial industry,  and the efficient implementation of the COSO framework 
in the  manufacturing and services industry.  
When control risk decreases thanks to an increase in IT Controls quality, auditors can 
place more trust in internal controls, including information technology controls, and can thus 
set up the planned detection risk based on control risk, establishing less substantive tests. The 
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decrease in substantive tests manifests itself in reduced audit effort, which in turn should 
reduce audit fees. 
Our study has however some limitations. The first limitation is the way IT Controls 
quality is measured: we used 3 variables but there may be other important elements, such as 
outsourcing (Mazza et al., 2014). The second limitation is the composition of the sample; it is 
composed of companies which responded to the questionnaire, which showed a higher size 
and a lower presence of losses than the population as a whole. The third limitation is related 
to the problem of omitted variables, because the omitted variable test is still significant in the 
manufacturing and service industries even after the inclusion of our explorative variables. 
Finally, we investigate IT Controls quality, but within ICFR, account-specific and entity level 
controls quality are important components which require further research. 
In spite of these limitations, however, this study provides useful indications for future 
research in auditing, particularly for closing the gap in the literature on the reduction of audit 
fees when the improvement of IT Controls reduces control risk. Given that improved IT 
Controls quality is shown to lead to reduced audit fees, regulators and auditors have strong 
grounds for promoting: 1) the application of the COSO framework in the manufacturing and 
services industry; 2) IT map and IT segregation of duties  in the financial industry. 
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Appendix A –Questionnaire 
 
Questions                                                                                         Answer 
 
Variables in the 
model 
1. IT Controls evaluation  
-Do you perform an IT Controls evaluation to comply with 
the law 262? 
 
 YES  NO IDENTIFICATI
ON OF THE 
SAMPLE 
2. IT Controls Scoping  
-Do you have a  matrix  that  includes  the  list  and  the  
description  of financial applications and IT infrastructure 
services in the scoping for the law 262?  
 YES  NO IT MAP 
-Do you evaluate the likelihood and the impact of the 
misstatement that one IT element could have on the 
financial reporting in the scoping for the law 262? 
 YES  NO IT RISK 
-Do you have an activity that understands if the IT 
elements support the business in the scoping for the law 
262? 
 YES  NO IT LINK 
3. IT Segregation of Duties 
 
    
Which department:   
 
-has the direct responsibility for IT Controls for the law 
262?  
 
 
 
-has the duty of test execution for IT Controls for the law 
262?  
 
 
 
 
-has the responsibility for IT Controls deficiencies 
remediation for the law 262? 
   
 
 IT department 
 Internal Audit  
 Other: 
_________________ 
 
 
 IT department 
 Internal Audit  
 Other: 
_________________ 
 
 
 IT department 
 Internal Audit  
 Other: 
_________________ 
 
IT CONTROLS 
SEGREGATIO
N OF DUTIES 
 
4.IT Controls Processes and Objectives                                                       Number  
 
 
-How many IT processes (develop, change, access, security 
and operations) have you identified for IT Controls? 
 
_ _ _ _ 
COSO AND 
COBIT 
COMPLIANCE 
-How many objectives have you defined for IT Controls? _ _ _ _ COBIT 
COMPLIANCE 
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Internal Auditor Detection Process and 
Internal Control Deficiencies Types 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates Internal Controls Deficiencies (ICD) in Italy, where the responsibility 
on Internal Control over Financial Reporting is assigned to Internal Auditor. We investigate 
Internal Audit Detection Process, analyzing the process of planning, scoping, testing, 
monitoring and ICD accounts-specific classified by severity as Deficiencies, Significant 
Deficiencies and Material Weaknesses. We use proprietary data from questionnaires. We find 
that several qualitative indicators and the top-down approach should be used in scoping and 
planning; the optimum frequency of testing would be every semester; re-performing or 
observation should be used instead of simple inspection of documentation; operation 
effectiveness of information technology and entity level controls should be tested; segregation 
of duties, education and experience of internal auditors are key elements. We also find that 
revenues are the most severe ICD types and that human resource and period end are the most 
persistent ICD types.  
 
Keywords: Internal Control, Internal Audit, Audit planning, Audit Methodology 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study addresses the topic of Internal Controls Deficiencies and focuses on Italy, 
where a law with the same objectives and origins as the United States of America (USA) 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has been implemented. The Italian setting presents however a 
different capital market and auditor legislation. Italy is interesting because it allows us to 
analyze the usefulness of the regulations implemented as a result of financial scandals in a 
civil law country where the market is driven by banks and financial institutions, with weak legal 
enforcement, weak investor protection and a low litigation risk, and the Italian “light SOX” makes 
fewer requirements overall for external auditors.  
The study tests two research questions related to ICD severity and persistence. We 
investigate two causes of the severity classification and persistence: 1) internal auditors 
detection process following Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing 
Standard 5 and 2) types of ICD types classified by literature. ICD types are accounts-specific. 
The internal auditors detection process is the process of planning and scoping or testing and 
monitoring influenced by the internal auditors characteristics. For internal auditors we refer to 
Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICFR) auditors, identified as responsible by the 
Italian law. We predict systematic differences in severity classifications and persistence across 
types of ICD and a lower probability of more severe and persistent ICD in companies with 
higher overall quality of internal control.  
Prior research uses publicly available annual report data to distinguish characteristics 
of companies disclosing MW under Section 404 or under Section 302 (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009). However, it does not address the full extent of 
detected control flaws, how those problems are detected, or how auditors determine which 
problems are disclosed. Because studies using publicly available data cannot directly examine 
the method of detection, research with access to this type of data is important.  
We use proprietary data on detected ICD, classified by severity as Deficiencies, 
Significant Deficiencies (SD) and Material Weaknesses (MW). Managers of a sample of 
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Italian listed companies provided the data answering at questionnaires. The data is private and 
thus more precise and comprehensive than public data, which allows us to give a contribution 
developing findings from previous literature.  
Furthermore, the private data gives indication on how ICD are detected by internal 
auditor detection process. The absence of data has not previously allowed research to address 
this topic. Our data provides information about the following: quantitative and qualitative 
indicators of firms, financial statement values and accounts in scoping, the type of qualitative 
indicators, the consideration of groups and the use of a top-down approach to analyze scoping 
quality. It gives information about the frequency of tests for account-specific, entity and 
information technology controls in terms of period and reports addressed, the type of tests 
(design or operation effectiveness/ based on decentralized documentation, observations or re-
performing) and the consolidation of the results. We also use data on segregation of duties, 
education and experience of ICFR auditors, which is innovative. 
The internal auditor detection process shows the situation about planning and scoping, 
testing and monitoring and ICFR auditors. The weakest part of scoping is the procedure to 
identify the financial statement values. Scoping quality can be improved with the use of a 
higher number of qualitative indicators, a control hierarchy based on financial reporting, and 
a perspective of the firm as a part of a group. Managers have improved the internal auditor 
detection process from the start-up period (2007-2009) to the operating period (2010-2012). 
Internal auditors perform the complete set of control tests (at account-specific, entity and 
information technology level) on average every year. The greatest difference between periods 
is the reports addressed by the tests and the type of tests for account-specific controls. In the 
start-up period, tests focus more on the annual financial report and are mainly decentralized 
inspections of documentation. In the operating period they focus on intermediate relationships 
and consist mainly of observations. Few companies perform tests on the operation 
effectiveness of entity level and information technology controls and few companies 
consolidate the results of all the tests. The level of segregation of duties among department 
shows that responsibility, test execution and remediation are usually assigned to two different 
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departments out of three, and in most of the sample, the ICFR auditors hold a post graduate 
qualification in Accounting and Business Administration. The ICFR auditors have on average 
between four and six years of experience mainly in the administrative area. 
We investigate this issue in a sample of 4284 ICD. Among account-specific controls, 
the very widespread ICD are those in accounting period-end/accounting policies, purchases, 
inventory, revenues, human resources, fixed assets and intangibles. The most severe ICD are 
purchase and revenue, while the ICD that increase more over time are on human resources, 
fixed assets and intangibles, period end and reconciliations. 
For the research question 1, results confirm a lower probability of more severe ICD in 
companies with higher overall quality of internal control. These results have several 
implications: several qualitative indicators and the top-down approach should be used in 
scoping and planning; the optimum frequency of testing would be to test all account-specific, 
entity and information technology controls every semester; re-performing or observation 
should be used instead of simple inspection of documentation; operation effectiveness of 
information technology and entity level controls should be tested; segregation of duties, 
education and experience of internal auditors are key elements to have an high ICFR quality. 
These results give a contribution at world-wide level because it addresses the quality of 
Internal Auditor Detection Process having private data on its internal structure and procedures. 
This analysis is often difficult due to the absence of data, even in the US market. 
For the research question 2, we found that revenues are the most severe ICD types and 
that human resource and period end are the most persistent ICD types. These results can be 
useful to other European country with similar contexts to Italy, i.e. civil law countries, bank-
driven, with low litigation risk (France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland) to 
understand the behavior of ICD in ICFR in listed companies, outside from the context of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act where the major part of the academic research focus on. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
The empirical setting of the study is the Italian stock market. This market is less 
developed than the USA market. The Italian market is more driven by banks and financial 
institutions than by investors and listed companies are only about 250. Italy is a civil law 
country and is characterized as having weak legal enforcement and weak investor protection 
(Choi and Wong, 2007). Italy also has low litigation risk based on the index in Wingate (1997). 
The litigation risk score is 6.22 for Italy, while Anglo-Saxon countries report scores above 10, 
with a maximum score of 15 for the USA. Italy’s score is similar to other non-Anglo-Saxon 
European countries like France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland (Cameran 
et al., 2013). 
Statutory Audit was adopted in Italy for all listed companies in 1975 by Presidential 
Decree D.P.R. 136/1975, and was later extended to unlisted companies in some regulated 
industries such as banks and insurance. The Italian market is considered to be thin, with 
auditors competing for a relatively small number of statutory audits (Gietzmann and Sen, 
2002). Audit is subject to mandatory audit firm and partner rotation. 
Internal Audit is a relatively new discipline in Italy, and there is no legal requirement 
for Italian companies to establish Internal Audit units. Financial service providers are the only 
exception to this (Arena and Azzone 2009; Cortesi et al. 2009; Mariani et al. 2010), but in 
2005 Law Number 262 introduced compulsory assessment of ICFR in 2005 (Law 262/2005). 
 
As SOX was enacted in the USA as a response to financial scandals like Enron and 
Worldcom, Law 262/2005 was enacted in Italy after financial scandals like Parmalat and Cirio. 
Law 262/2005 requires CFO to attest ICFR effectiveness. The Italian law has a clear objective, 
but the implementation procedure is not defined.  Due to the absence of compulsory 
framework, Italian listed companies mainly test ICFR following Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission report (COSO 2006), Control Objectives for 
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Information and related Technology (COBIT, 2007; COBIT for SOX, 2006) (Azzali and 
Mazza, 2012). 
The USA and Italian laws have the same objectives of seeking to protect shareholders 
from financial scandals and fraudulent practices. There are , however, many differences in 
aspects such as effective date, phase-in period, authority, field of application, object of control, 
the main sections related to ICFR, responsibilities, frameworks for ICFR and external auditing 
principles used for listed companies and severity of ICD (Table 1). Law 262 was passed in 
2005 but came into force only in the second half of 2007, nearly five years after the USA law. 
Second, in the USA the PCAOB was set up, whereas in Italy there is no separate authority 
setting guidelines or supervising auditors, and there was no facilitation or phase-in period 
either. Furthermore, in the USA, supervision is extended to the overall internal control system 
while in Italy only ICFR is supervised. As Security Exchange Commission in USA, the 
“COmmisione Nazionale per le SOcietà e la Borsa” (CONSOB) in Italy oversees the financial 
markets. For example, CONSOB provide indications about the reporting to comply with Law 
262/2005, proposing a report type (CONSOB report). The main section of Law 262/2005 
covering ICFR is Art. 154 – bis. The disclosure and the assessment provided for by Sections 
404 and 302 of the SOX are wider and the compliance is more costly than Art. 154 – bis; 
Italian Law 262 is in fact known as “Light SOX”. But the biggest difference between the two 
laws lies in the responsibilities and role of external auditors. In Italy, external auditors are not 
required to certify the reliability of the Internal Control System of the company; they have no 
direct responsibility for the design and effectiveness of ICFR. Another important difference 
concerns the frameworks for ICFR. Companies are required to state which frameworks they 
use. In Italy on the other hand, no frameworks exist and companies have the choice to state or 
not which international or own-developed frameworks they use. Italy follows National 
Auditing Standards laid down by the “Consiglio Nazionale Dottori commercialisti ed Esperti 
Contabili” based on International Standard of Auditing (ISA). Disclosure of ICD is higher in 
USA. In Italy, CONSOB reports include a section that could show ICD, but in early 
applications of Law 262, no ICD have been disclosed to the market because CONSOB doesn’t 
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mandatory require them. For the purposes of this study, we request internal data on ICD, 
classified as Deficiencies, Significant Deficiencies and Material Weaknesses, output of the 
ICFR testing. Auditing Standard No. 5 issued by PCAOB (paragraph 63), shows that ICD 
severity classification depends on “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the company’s 
control will fail to prevent or detect a misstatement of an account balance or disclosure; and 
the magnitude of the potential misstatement resulting from the deficiency”. Prior research 
implies that the component tasks of classifying the severity of ICD through judging the 
likelihood and the materiality of misstatement are unstructured, complex, and difficult 
(Messier et al. 2005; Allen et al. 2006). Sources of difficulty can be, for example, 
inconsistency in definitions and interpretation of the materiality (Bedard and Graham 2011). 
Because Italy has no frameworks for severity classification, we based our research on the 
PCAOB definition as a benchmark. 
 
 
  
Table 1 - Main differences between Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Law 262 related to Internal Controls over Financial Reporting  
 
Law 262 – 2005 - Italy Sarbanes-Oxley Act – 2002 - USA Differences/Similarities 
Objective Protection shareholder from fraudulent 
practices 
Protection shareholder from fraudulent practices Same 
Origin Financial scandals and fraudulent 
practices 
Financial scandals and fraudulent practices Same 
Effective Date 2007 2002 (302), 2004 (404) 5 years later in Italy 
Phase-in 
period 
No phase-in period For non accelerated and foreign private issuers, 
the act is effective from 2006 
No phase-in period in Italy 
Authority  COmmisione Nazionale per le SOcietà e 
la Borsa - CONSOB (corresponding to 
USA SEC) 
Security Exchange Commission - SEC 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board - 
PCAOB 
No separate/specific authority that states 
guidelines and control the auditors in Italy 
Field of 
application 
All listed companies and public 
companies owned by the State 
Facilitations for non-accelerated public 
companies and foreign private issuers 
No facilitations in Italy 
Object of 
control 
Internal Controls over Financial 
Reporting (ICFR) 
Internal Controls System Focus on ICFR in Italy and wider control 
object in USA 
Main Section 
related to 
ICFR 
Art. 154 –bis (comma 1 to 6) Section 404 and 302 The disclosure and the assessment 
provided for by Section 404 and 302 are 
wider and more costly than Art. 154 – bis. 
Law 262 in Italy is called “Light Sox”. 
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Responsibility Board of Directors, Audit Committee, 
Chief Financial Officer 
Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Chief 
Financial Officer, External Auditor 
No direct responsibility of External 
Auditor by the Italian law (262/2005).  
Framework 
for ICFR  
Not defined in the law but companies may 
explicit the ICFR and ITC frameworks 
employed 
Not defined in the law but companies must 
show the ICFR and ITC frameworks employed 
In USA is compulsory for companies to 
explicit the ICFR framework employed; in 
Italy is not compulsory. In Italy a national 
framework for ICFR does  not exist 
External 
Auditing 
Principles to 
be employed 
for listed 
companies 
National Auditing Standard stated by 
Consiglio Nazionale Dottori 
commercialisti ed Esperti Contabili. They 
are similar to ISA of IFAC 
National Auditing Standard stated by Auditing 
Standard Board of American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants 
Both Italy and USA employ National 
Auditing Standards. 
Disclosure of 
ICD 
ICD are not disclosed to the market. 
The CONSOB report employed by CFO, 
includes a paragraph that should show 
ICD. In the first implementation of the 
law, however, reports do not show any 
ICD.  
Reports employed by CFO and auditors show 
SD and MW.  
Facilitations for non-accelerated public 
companies and foreign private issuers 
Absence of effective disclosure in Italy. 
 
  
Much previous research has investigated the ICD after SOX on US market, but even if 
the European Commission does not issue European Directive on ICFR, the legislator of 
individual European countries issued similar laws with the same objective of SOX and it is 
important to investigate the ICD after these laws also in the European market. This study 
investigate Law 262/2005, that is a national  law  issued by the Italian government in autonomy. 
The identification of ICD output of the ICFR evaluation due to the application of Law 262/2005 
can only be investigated in Italy thanks to the private data collected by the Italian companies. 
This research can be useful to other European country with similar contexts, i.e. civil law 
countries, bank-driven, with low litigation risk (France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and 
Switzerland) to understand the behavior of ICD in ICFR in listed companies. This 
understanding is useful for the company itself, but also for external auditors in the assessing of 
internal control system reliability, even if the country has not a regulation for ICFR attestation. 
This research can give a contribution also at world-wide level because it addresses the 
quality of Internal Auditor Detection Process having private data on its internal structure and 
procedures. This analysis is often difficult due to the absence of data, even in the US market. 
 
 
3. LITERATURE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
3.1. Internal Auditor Detection Process 
 
Prior literature address Internal Audit quality (Regoliosi and D'Eri, 2004; Allegrini et 
al. 2006; Lenz et al. 2014; Sarens and Lamboglia 2014; Sarens et al. 2011; Sarens and 
Abdolmohammadi 2011; Christopher et al. 2009; Prawitt et al. 2009), we specifically give a 
contribution in the Internal Auditor detection process of ICD to attest ICFR. Because one big 
difference between Law 262/2005 and SOX is that in Italy the detection process of ICD to attest 
ICFR is performed only by Internal Auditors, our fist contribution is to investigate its 
procedures through the audit cycle phases established by PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 
(Planning-Scoping, Testing-Monitoring) and its structure through the IA characteristics. Italy 
is the best context where to investigate this issue because Law 262/2005 does not introduce the 
external auditors responsibility in ICFR attestation. Therefore Italy is the only country in the 
world where this analysis can be performed. 
We based the following IA detection process on PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, 
because, as explained in the background, there are not Italian guidelines to implement Law 
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262/2005, and from interviews we conclude that all the companies in our sample use US 
frameworks (Azzali and Mazza, 2012). 
 
3.1.1. Planning and Scoping 
Planning and scoping is evaluated following PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, 
paragraph 21-41. It is of high quality if it uses both quantitative and qualitative indicators for 
firms, financial statement values and accounts selection. We also investigate the kinds of 
qualitative indicators for firms and accounts selections, the view of a firm as a part of a group, 
the control hierarchy based on top-down approach. We expect that a high quality of planning 
and scoping decreases the presence of more severe and persistent ICD. 
 
 
3.1.2. Testing and Monitoring  
For testing and monitoring, we follow PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, paragraph 42-
61. We expect that the speed of the testing process (FREQUENCY) is negatively associated 
with the detection probability of SD and MW or persistent ICD. We define the account-specific 
control test frequency as annual or semi-annual. We define the entity-information technology 
level control test frequency as multi annual given that the entire control system at these levels 
is similar in the near years, and a company can also opt to test it in a cycle longer than the fiscal 
year. Regarding frequency, account-specific controls are addressed to all the documents with 
financial data. We thus develop an ordinary measure of quality assigning a higher level of 
quality when they are addressed to more documents.  
Research on external audit investigate substantive tests. We investigate control tests on 
design and operation effectiveness of account-specific, entity and information technology 
controls.  
We investigate the most common tests on operation effectiveness for account-specific 
control. The tests can be: self-assessment, decentralized inspection of documentation, 
observation and re-performing. For entity level and information technology controls, most 
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companies evaluate only the design of controls, and we define as internal control quality the 
presence of tests also on operation effectiveness. Results consolidation is a further indicator of 
higher quality of procedures. We predict that the high quality of testing and monitoring 
decreases the presence of more severe and persistent ICD. 
 
3.1.3. ICFR Auditors 
We measure expertise and independence using the idea that managers with higher 
qualifications, more years of experience and prior jobs in control have more knowledge of 
internal controls and that managers carrying out higher segregation of duties are more 
independent. We expect that the probability of more severe and persistent ICD decreases with 
education, expertise and segregation of duties of the parties performing the work (internal 
auditor detection process quality). 
 
RQ1a= Are there cross section variation within ICD severity due to the internal audit 
detection process? 
 
RQ1b= Are there cross section variation within ICD persistence due to the internal 
audit detection process? 
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3.2.ICD types 
 
Differences in effective date and in object of control (focus only on ICFR) between Law 
262/2005 and SOX, have bring Italian company to more develop the account-specific controls 
overall in the start-up period (2007-2009). We thus investigate the variation due to the type of 
account-specific ICD to understand which are the more problematic issue in countries civil law, 
bank-driven, with low litigation risk that have to been addressed by the company itself to 
guarantee a reliable ICFR, indirectly useful also to external auditors. 
Literature and professional standards on Section 404, such as PCAOB Auditing 
Standard No. 5 paragraph 28-33, require specific consideration of accounts and assertions. 
While past studies find little difference in control risk assessments across accounts/assertions 
(Elder and Allen, 2003), current standards suggest that there may be systematic differences in 
severity classifications across types of ICD, such as account-specific ICD (Bedard and Graham, 
2011). PCAOB notes that the auditor should consider the nature of the affected financial 
statement accounts in assessing the likelihood of misstatements that may result from an 
inoperative control.  
We consider whether severity classifications and persistence vary according to the 
nature of the account-specific ICD where ICD are classified for financial statement 
accounts/cycle based on literature (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and 
McVay, 2005; Bedard and Graham, 2011).   
Ge and McVay (2005) found that MW tend to be related to deficient revenues-
recognition policies, lack of segregation of duties, deficiencies in the period-end reporting 
process and accounting policies, and inappropriate account reconciliation. The most common 
account-specific MW occurs in current accrual accounts, such as the accounts receivable and 
inventory accounts. Other frequent MW occur in complex accounts, such as derivative and 
income tax accounts. The contribution of  Doyle et al. (2007) is to find that the determinants 
vary based on the type of control problems (serious entity-wide or account-specific), and on the 
specific reason for the material weakness, consistent with each firm facing their own unique set 
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of internal control challenges. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) underline the difference in the 
existence of a MW and in detecting (finding and reporting) it. Bedard and Graham, (2011) find 
that account-specific ICD related to revenues are more severe in US.  
 
RQ2a= Are there cross section variation within ICD severity due to type of ICD? 
 
RQ2b= Are there cross section variation within ICD persistence due to type of ICD? 
 
 
4. METHOD 
 
4.1.Questionnaire and Sample  
 
We collected private data through interviews and questionnaires. We conducted 
exploratory interviews to understand the implementation of Law 262/2005. Face-to-face 
interviews of CFO or financial staff were carried out by two professors and a PhD student.  
Each interview lasted about 3 hours because after answering the first general question, firms  
often showed us their procedures. The information collected was mainly used to draw up  
questionnaires and interpret responses to it. We prepared questionnaires together with external 
auditors from one of the Big4. We discussed and selected instruments for each construct based 
on frameworks. External auditors made a key contribution in ensuring language would be 
comprehensible for the target companies. Questionnaires were next tested and on the basis of 
their responses and comments, the questionnaire, the study design and the measurement of some 
constructs were slightly adapted. Questionnaires focused on evaluating the period 2007-2012 
and was distributed by email.  The distribution procedure involved sending a survey package 
containing questionnaires and a covering email underlining the importance of the research and 
encouraging firms to reply. In order to increase the response rate, companies which had not yet 
responded were contacted by phone. We opted to make the questionnaire confidential, i.e. 
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although the names of respondent companies are known to us they are not disclosed here and 
results are shown only in aggregate form. We were thus able to link the data collected by 
questionnaires with other sources. Finally, we hand-collected data from the consolidated annual 
reports for firms using IFRS, from company web sites and the website of the Borsa Italiana, the 
Italian Stock Exchange.  In addition, it was emphasized that the research was under the auspices 
of a well-known university, widely recognized as trustworthy, so that firms could be confident 
that sensitive information would not be disclosed.  
 
The 255 Italian companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange are the population 
explicitly targeted at monitoring and assuring compliance with Law 262/2005. We exclude 
from the analysis the financial industry because of the different types of accounts in their 
financial report.  
We received 14 answers over 211 companies in non-financial industry. To perform 
regression analysis we consider the number of ICD as observations, as Bedard and Graham 
(2011). Our sample comprises 4284 specific ICD detected by ICFR auditors for 14 companies 
in 6 years (84 firm-year observations, “n” in Table 2). In comparison with the study by Bedard 
and Graham (2011), we use a lower numbers of companies (14 versus 44), a longer period of 
time (6 versus 2 years) resulting in a higher number of ICD (4284 versus 3990 ICD).  
 
Table 2 -  Sample Selection 
Description N. 
Mean number of ICD for each firm-year  50 
Mean number of observations (ICD) for the period 2007-2012 for each firm 300 
Total number of observations (ICD) for the period 2007-2012 for 14 companies 
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange that answered at the questionnaire (6.6% of 
the population) 
4284 
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The number of ICD detected could be related to the composition of the sample. Our 
sample mainly includes big Italian listed companies that have invested a lot of human and 
finance resources in compliance with Law 262/2005, although it does not make as many 
requirements as the USA SOX. At the beginning, in 2007, the companies modified their internal 
organization, some requesting help from consulting firms at high non-audit fees. They 
attempted to reorganize internal control systems, especially internal control over financial 
reporting, and to implement advanced evaluation procedures. Finally, we matched the 
questionnaire data with the financial data for each fiscal year and we break the period in two 
sub-periods: the start-up period (2007-2009) and the operating period (2010-2012). From 2007 
to 2009, big changes took place in the internal structure of many companies in for example 
assignment of responsibilities and the organization chart.  
 
To check the validity of the database, we select specific questions for the internal 
auditors detection process for which is easier to receive answers and we ask at the companies 
that do not have answered at the full questionnaires if they can answer at only these questions. 
We compare the mean of the answer in our sample (14 companies) with the mean of the answer 
of this control group (35 companies). Two-groups mean comparison test do not show significant 
differences, supporting the validity of the data for Italian companies that comply with Law 
262/2005 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 - Mean Comparison  
Variable 
Our sample 
Mean 
Control 
group 
Two-groups mean 
comparison 
(two-tailed p-value) 
SCOPING QUALITY 
3.23 3.06 
-0.41 
(0.68) 
ACC_TESTS FOR 
FINANCIAL 
REPORTING 
1.85 2.11 
1.54 
(0.12) 
ACC_TEST TYPE 
1.54 1.37 
-1.29 
(0.20) 
n 14 35  
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4.2.Model 
 
First, we perform univariate tests for differences between two periods: the start-up 
period that includes years 2007-2008-2009; and the operating period that includes years 2010-
2011-2012. We use group mean comparison t-tests for the ordered variables and Pearson Х2 
tests (with d.f. =1) for the dummy variables. For the t-test, we first perform the sd-test (standard 
deviation test) and then use the t-test with unequal variance if the group mean comparison sd-
test is significant. Secondly, we perform the following multivariate logistic regression with 
severity, a dummy variable as the dependent variable. 
 
SEVERITY or PERSISTENCE = β0 + ∑16n=1 βn ICD TYPES + ∑21n=17 βn INTERNAL 
AUDITOR DETECTION PROCESS + ∑38n=22 βn CONTROL VARIABLES + year dummy 
variable included 
 
We use a logistic regression model to test RQ regarding factors associated with severity 
classification or persistence of ICD.  
The dependent variable for severity is SD/MW: 1 MW or SD, 0 Deficiency. It 
investigates factors associated with ICD meeting the criterion for a “more than remote” 
likelihood of failing to detect or prevent a misstatement i.e., at least SD classification, implying 
that the ICD must be reported at least to management and the audit committee.  
The other dependent variable is PERSISTENCE: 1 if the number of a specific type-
severity level ICD for a company of the following year is equal or bigger than that number in 
the prior year; 0 otherwise. 
 
ICD TYPES definitions are presented in Table 4. ICD TYPES are all dummy variables 
for which their sum is equal to 1. To perform the regression we drop one type to be included in 
the constant (β0) and to interpret the results in comparison with this type. To choose which ICD 
type use as benchmark, we based on the results of prior research finding that revenues is one of 
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the most important ICD type (Ge and McVay, 2005; Bedard and Graham, 2011). Thus all the 
coefficients of the regression have to be interpreted in comparison with ICD on 
ACC_REVENUE. 
 
INTERNAL AUDITOR DETECTION PROCESS definitions are presented in Table 4. 
These are dummies and ordinal variables built to have a measure of IA detection process 
quality. An higher code means an higher quality. 
 
We derive our predictions for company-level control variables from prior research 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay, 2005).  
We expect a negative sign on SIZE, given that prior research shows that smaller 
companies have more serious internal control problems. We expect that bad performance will 
be associated with more severe ICD, generating a positive sign on LOSS. We also expect that 
company complexity and riskiness will be positively associated with ICD severity, including 
B/M, M&A, SEGMENTS, FOREIGN, and RESTRUCTURING and LITIGATION for 
complexity and riskiness. We expect that companies with longer tradition and experience have 
lower serious internal control problems, generating a negative sign on FIRM AGE.  
Characteristics of the Italian context are the widespread perception of a lack of 
independence by outside directors and weak legal protection for small investors (Volpin 2002; 
Di Pietra et al. 2008). In this context, agency conflicts between large insider and minority 
outsider shareholders are mitigated by internal control mechanisms, such as the board of 
directors and its internal committees (Allegrini and Greco 2013).The characteristics of 
corporate governance that can influence the disclosure of MW, SD or CD are audit committee 
and board of director size, number of meetings of audit committee and board of directors, 
accounting and supervisory experience of members, independence of members (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2007), Hoitash et al. (2009), Hermanson et al. (2009), Shu et al. (2011), Goh 
(2009). Therefore we include a GOVERNANCE SCORE covering these variables to control 
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for its association with the severity of the ICD and we expect a negative sign following Doyle 
et al. (2007). 
Because the work of the external auditor is closely related to internal control quality, we 
also control for external audit characteristics. One strand of literature found higher audit fees in 
the presence of internal control problems (Raghunandan and Dasaratha 2006; Hoitash et al. 
2008; Hogan and Wilkins 2008). Krishnan et al. (2008) examine both total costs and auditor 
attestation costs associated with SOX 404: all the costs are higher for ICFR MW firms. 
Furthermore, Hoitash et al. (2008) find that audit pricing for companies with internal control 
problems varies by problem severity or by nature of the problem. Therefore, we expect a 
positive association between severity of ICD and AUDIT FEES. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; 
Ge and McVay, 2005) find a positive association with the disclosure of MW and BIG4. We 
expect a positive relation between the ICD severity and BIG4. 
In our sample there are not companies cross-listed in USA that have to comply with 
SOX; therefore we do not have to add this control variable in our model. Analysis of audit 
opinion reveals that all the companies in our sample appear to be clean. 
A dummy to control for the year effect is added. 
 
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
5.1.Internal Auditor Detection Process 
 
Table 4 describes Company-Level Client Control and Detection Process Variables. 
 
 
Table 4 - Company-Level Control and Detection Process Variables: Mean (Std. Dev.) or Percent = 1 
Variable 
All 
Firms-
year 
(n=84) 
Start-up 
period 
2007-
2009 
(n=42) 
Operatin
g  period 
2010-
2012 
(n=42) 
NUM_MW  number of material weaknesses. 1 
(3) 
1 
(4) 
1 
(2) 
NUM_SD  number of significant deficiencies. 10 
(21) 
12 
(25) 
9 
(15) 
NUM_Deficiencies number of control deficiencies. 82 
(106) 
84 
(104) 
78 
(108) 
 
PLANNING AND SCOPING 
FIRMS 
 
1 = if to include a firm in the scope both quantitative AND qualitative indicators are used 
0 = if to include a firm in the scope quantitative OR qualitative OR neither indicators are used 
73% 67% 79%* 
FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT 
VALUES 
1 = if to include a financial statement value in the scope both quantitative AND qualitative 
indicators are used 
0 = if to include a financial statement value in the scope quantitative OR qualitative OR 
neither indicators are used 
71% 63% 79%** 
ACCOUNTS 1 = if to include an account associated with financial statement value in the scope both 
quantitative AND qualitative indicators are used 
0 = if to include an account associated with financial statement value in the scope quantitative 
OR qualitative OR neither indicators are used 
75% 67% 83%** 
SCOPING FIRMS+ FINANCIAL STATEMENT VALUES+ ACCOUNTS (3=highly effective to 0 = 
highly ineffective) 
2.19 
(1.09) 
1.96 
(0.71) 
2.42*** 
(0.82)*** 
FIRMS’ 
QUALITATIVE 
INDICATORS 
 
2 = if the qualitative indicators are the operative risk AND the type of contract (warranties, 
risks) 
1 = if the qualitative indicators are only operative risk  
0 = otherwise 
1.02 
(0.66) 
0.92 
(0.71) 
1.13 
(0.60) 
ACCOUNTS’ 
QUALITATIVE 
INDICATORS 
 
2 = if the qualitative indicators are: the extraordinary events, the volatility of the financial 
count, the specific risks linked to the financial count 
1 = if the qualitative indicators are the specific risks linked to the financial count 
0 = otherwise 
1.15 
(0.71) 
1.08 
(0.76) 
1.21* 
(0.65) 
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GROUP/SINGLE 
ENTITY 
1 = if to include a firm in the scope, it is considered as a part of the group 
0 = if to include a firm in the scope, it is considered only as a single entity 
40% 38% 42% 
CONTROLS 
HIERARCHY  
1 = if a control hierarchy based on top-down approach is performed 
0 = otherwise 
67% 63% 71% 
SCOPING 
QUALITY 
FIRMS’ QUALITATIVE INDICATORS+ ACCOUNTS’ QUALITATIVE INDICATORS+ 
GROUP/SINGLE ENTITY+ CONTROLS HIERARCHY (6=highly effective to 0= highly 
ineffective) 
3.23 
(1.60) 
3.00 
(1.79) 
3.46* 
(1.36)** 
 
TESTING AND MONITORING 
   
ACC_TEST 
FREQUENCY 
2 = every six months 
1 = every year 
0 = not applicable 
1.27 
(0.57) 
1.21 
(0.65) 
1.33 
(0.47)*** 
ENTITY AND 
IT_TEST 
FREQUENCY 
3 = every six months 
2 = every year 
1 = multi-year 
0 = not applicable 
2.29 
(0.79) 
2.29 
(0.85) 
2.29 
(0.74) 
ACC_TESTS FOR 
FINANCIAL 
REPORTING  
1 = more than 50% for the annual financial report 
2 = more than 50% for the intermediate relations 
3 = more than 50% for the two quarterly relations 
0 = not applicable 
1.85 
(0.84) 
1.67 
(0.95) 
2.04*** 
(0.68)*** 
FREQUENCY ACC_TEST FREQUENCY + ENTITY_TEST FREQUENCY + ACC_TESTS FOR 
FINANCIAL REPORTING (8=highly effective to 0 = highly ineffective) 
5.41 
(1.61) 
5.17 
(1.90) 
5.67* 
(1.22)*** 
ACC_TEST TYPE 1 = inspections of documentation decentralized 
2 = observations  
3 = reperforming 
0 = not applicable 
1.54 
(0.92) 
1.38 
(0.96) 
1.71** 
(0.85) 
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ENTITY AND 
IT_OPERATION 
EFFECTIVENESS 
TEST 
 
1 = if operation effectiveness test have been performed on entity and information technology 
level controls 
0 = otherwise 
31% 29% 33% 
RESULTS 
CONSOLIDATION 
 
1 = if the results of the monitoring are consolidated 
0 = otherwise 
56% 50% 63% 
TESTING 
QUALITY 
ACC_TEST TYPE + ENTITY_OPERATION EFFECTIVENESS TEST + RESULTS 
CONSOLIDATION (5=highly effective to 0 = highly ineffective) 
2.41 
(1.26) 
2.17 
(1.35) 
2.76** 
(1.11)* 
 
ICFR AUDITORS 
   
SEGREGATION OF 
DUTIES  
 
 
The number of duties actually assigned to a different department divided by the number of 
duties that could be assigned to a different department (3 = RESPONSIBILITY, TEST 
EXECUTION, REMEDIATION) 
#duties assigned to different department by questionnaire
3
 
(1=high segragation to 0.33= low segregation) 
0.65 
(0.20) 
0.63 
(0.20) 
0.67 
(0.19) 
EDUCATION  1 = if all the ICFR auditors have a master degree in Accounting and Business administration 
0 = if at least one the ICFR auditors have education different 
 
69% 71% 67% 
YEARS OF 
EXPERIENCE 
1 = if most of ICFR auditors have between 0 and 1 years of experience 
2 = if most of ICFR auditors have between 2 and 3 years of experience 
3 = if most of ICFR auditors have between 4 and 6 years of experience 
4 = if most of ICFR auditors have more than 6 years 
2.94 
(1.18) 
2.58 
(1.39) 
3.29*** 
(0.80)*** 
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PREVIOUS 
EXPERIENCE 
1 = no previous experience 
2 = previous experience in other company 
3 = previous experience in the administrative staff of the same company 
4 = previous experience in internal audit  staff of the same company 
2.94 
(0.97) 
2.83 
(1.03) 
3.04 
(0.90) 
ICFR AUDITORS 
QUALITY 
SEGREGATION OF DUTIES + EDUCATION+ YEARS OF EXPERIENCE+ PREVIOUS 
EXPERIENCE(10=highly effective to 1.67 = highly ineffective) 
 
7.21 
(1.73) 
6.75 
(1.97) 
7.67*** 
(1.31)*** 
*, **, *** Indicate ≤0.10, ≤0.05, and ≤0.01, respectively, with one-tailed probability levels for t-tests. 
This table presents descriptive statistics on company-level variables, with differences between periods initial/subsequent using group mean comparison t-
tests with unequal variance if the group mean comparison sd-test is significant or Pearson _2 tests _with d.f. =1) for the dummy variables. 
  
5.1.1. Planning and Scoping 
Both quantitative and qualitative indicators are used in the scoping process by 71-73-75 
percent of the full sample companies, resulting in a scoping score (as sum of three variables in 
Table 2) of 2 over 3. The weakest part of scoping is the procedure to identify financial statement 
values (71%; 63% in the first period and 79% in the next period). 
Scoping quality (as sum of four variables in Table 2) is just over the half of the code 
(3.23 on the scale of 0= low quality to 6= high quality): about 50 percent of the sample use a 
bigger number of qualitative indicators than the single qualitative indicator based on operative 
risk and specific risks linked to the financial statement (such as type of contract, warranties, 
risks, extraordinary events, volatility); 67 percent of the sample perform a control hierarchy 
based on financial reporting while only 40 percent of the sample view the firms in the scoping 
as a part of the group rather than a single entity.  
Companies in the start-up period of implementation have a lower mean in SCOPING 
and SCOPING QUALITY than those in the following period (1.96 versus 2.42, p = 0.01; and 
3 versus 3.46, p = 0. 10). 
 
5.1.2. Testing And Monitoring 
Frequency is effective (5.41 on the scale of 0= highly ineffective to 8= highly effective). 
Client internal auditors perform the entire set of control tests (at account specific, entity and 
information technology level) on average every year,  and more than 50% of the tests are for 
the intermediate relations (reported every six month). The greatest difference between periods 
is the type of the report the tests are run for: in the start-up period tests focus on  the annual 
financial report, while in the next period they focus on the intermediate relations (1.67 versus 
2.04, p = 0.007).  
Testing quality is middle effective (2.41 on the scale of 0= highly ineffective to 5= 
highly effective).  
We investigate the most common tests on operation effectiveness for account specific 
level control and the presence of these tests for entity and information technology level control. 
The greatest difference between periods is in the type of tests for account specific level controls: 
in the start-up period the tests are mainly decentralized inspections of documentation, while in 
the following period they are mainly observations (1.38 versus 1.71, p = 0.028). In our sample 
companies do not make use of self-assessment or centralized inspection of documentation tests 
because they have low reliability; they should be used only as additional tests. Regarding entity 
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level and information technology controls, only about 30 percent of the sample perform the 
tests on the operation effectiveness. Finally the results of these tests should ideally be 
consolidated, but this is done by only 56 percent of the sample (50% in the first period, 63% in 
the following period). 
 
5.1.3. ICFR Auditors 
ICFR auditor quality is effective (7.21 on the scale of 1.67= highly ineffective to 10= 
highly effective). ITC responsibility, test execution and remediation are usually assigned to two 
different departments out of three (about 67%) and in about 70% of the sample, all ICFR 
auditors have a postgraduate qualification in Accounting and Business Administration. The 
ICFR auditors have an average of between four and six years of experience (the number varies 
with the passage of time) and a good level of previous experience. 
 
5.2. ICD types 
Table 5 shows the percentage composition of detected ICD by severity category. 
 
  
Table 5 – Percentage Composition of Detected ICD by Severity Category 
  All Deficiencies Significant Deficiencies Material Weaknesses 
  
All 
(4284= 
100%) 
Start-
up 
(2526= 
100%) 
Oper  
(1758= 
100%) 
All 
(3258= 
100%) 
Start-
up 
(1902= 
100%) 
Oper  
(1356= 
100%) 
All 
(978= 
100%) 
Start-
up 
(576= 
100%) 
Oper  
(402= 
100%) 
All 
(48= 
100%) 
Start-
up 
(33= 
100%) 
Oper  
(15= 
100%) 
ACC_ 
REVENUES 
1 = if the problems are in the account-specific controls 
in the revenue to cash cycle, in the design and review 
of revenue-recognition policies, in the contracting 
practices, in the detection of side letters and the 
process of investigating customer assertions regarding 
terms not specified in the agreements. 
0 = otherwise 
10% 9% 10% 6% 5% 6% 22% 22% 23% 25% 27% 20% 
ACC_ 
PURCHASES 
1 = if the problems are in the account-specific controls 
in the purchase to payment cycle. 
0 = otherwise 
16% 17% 
14% 
** 
13% 12% 14% 22% 27% 
16% 
*** 
62.5% 61% 67% 
ACC_ 
INVENTORY 
1 = if the problems are in the account-specific controls 
in inventory. 
0 = otherwise 
12% 13% 
10% 
*** 
15% 17% 
12% 
*** 
2.5% 1% 
4% 
** 
0% 0% 0% 
ACC_ 
HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
1 = if the problems are in the account-specific controls 
in the compensation, payroll and benefits, 
competences and segregation of duties of the human 
resources 
0 = otherwise 
10% 8% 
13% 
*** 
11% 9% 
14% 
*** 
8% 6% 
10% 
** 
0% 0% 0% 
ACC_ 
FIXEDASSET 
AND 
INTANGIBLE 
1 = if the problems are in the account-specific controls 
in the fixed assets (e.g., existence, amortization) and 
intangibles (e.g., existence and capitalization, 
impairment test) 
0 = otherwise 
10% 9% 
12% 
*** 
10% 9% 
11% 
** 
11% 9% 
14% 
*** 
6.25% 6% 6.5% 
ACC_ 
TAXES 
1 = if the problems are in the account-specific controls 
in taxes 
0 = otherwise 
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3.5% 5% 
1% 
*** 
0% 0% 0% 
ACC_ 
TREASURY 
1 = if the problems are in the account-specific controls 
in treasury and investments. 
0 = otherwise 
7% 11% 
2% 
*** 
7% 10% 
3% 
*** 
9% 15% 
1% 
*** 
6.25% 6% 6.5% 
ACC_ 
PERIOD-END/ 
ACCOUNT. 
POLICIES 
1 = if the problems are in the period-end reporting 
process (closing process), in the application of new 
accounting principles or existing accounting 
principles to new transactions, in the absence or 
ineffectiveness of a rule compliance, in the record 
keeping and compliance assistance for reports 
required, in the authorization, recognition, capture, 
and review of transactions, facts, circumstances, and 
19% 18% 
21% 
* 
20% 21% 19% 17% 11% 
25% 
*** 
0% 0% 0% 
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events that could have a material impact on the 
company’s financial reporting process, in the design 
of policies and execution of processes related to 
accounting for transactions, in the establishment of 
standards for review of journal entries and related 
file documentation, in the accounting and financial 
reporting infrastructure for collecting, analyzing, and 
consolidating information to prepare the consolidated 
financial statements, in the procedures for 
appropriately assessing and applying disclosures and 
requirements, in the application of accounting 
policies 
0 = otherwise 
ACC_ 
ACCOUNT 
RECONCIL. 
1 = if the problems are in certain accounting 
reconciliations and review procedures or in lack of 
compliance with established procedures for 
monitoring and adjusting balances relating to certain 
accruals and provisions, including restructuring 
charges. 
0 = otherwise 
5% 5% 
6% 
** 
6% 5% 
7% 
** 
2.5% 2% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
ACC_ 
SUBSIDIARY 
SPECIFIC 
1 = if the problems are  in the timely completion of 
statutory filings in foreign countries, in the 
application of company policies among business 
units and segments, in the timely and complete 
revelation of material contracts entered into by 
subsidiaries of the company, in control that could 
have permitted employees at certain company 
improper transactions, unauthorized trading or cash 
payments, in the procedure of consolidation (e.g., 
consolidation area, intergroup transaction, minority 
interests recognition, business combination). 
0 = otherwise 
8% 7% 9% 9% 9% 10% 2.5% 2% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
Among account-specific controls, the most widespread ICD are ACC_PERIOD-
END/ACCOUNTING POLICIES ICD: period-end reporting process (closing process), the 
application of new accounting principles or existing accounting principles to new transactions, 
the absence or ineffectiveness of rule compliance, record keeping and compliance assistance 
for reports, the authorization, recognition, capture, and review of transactions, facts, 
circumstances, and events that could have a material impact on the company’s financial 
reporting process, the design of policies and execution of processes related to accounting for 
transactions, the establishment of standards for review of journal entries and related file 
documentation, the accounting and financial reporting infrastructure for collecting, analyzing, 
and consolidating information to prepare the consolidated financial statements, the procedures 
for appropriately assessing and applying disclosures and requirements and the application of 
accounting policies.  
After that, the most frequent ICD are ACC_PURCHASES (16%), ACC_INVENTORY 
(12%) and ACC_REVENUESS, ACC_HUMAN RESOURCES, ACC_FIXEDASSETS AND 
INTANGIBLES (10%). Critical areas are related to: the hierarchy of greater presence of ICD 
in account-specific controls in the revenues to cash cycle,  the design and review of revenues-
recognition policies,  contracting practices,  the detection of side letters and the process of 
investigating customer assertions regarding terms not specified in the agreements, 
compensation, payroll and benefits, human resource duties, fixed assets (existence, 
amortization) and intangibles (existence and capitalization, impairment test) where ICD are 
more widespread than ICD in account-specific controls in taxes, commitments and 
contingencies and  in treasury and investments. The most severe ICD are ACC_PURCHASES 
(62.5% of MW and 22% of SD) and ACC_REVENUES (25% of MW and 22% of SD). We 
note that although ACC_TREASURY is less frequent; when it is present, it shows severe ICD 
(6.25% of MW and 9% of SD). 
Looking at the difference in the frequency between the start up period and the operating 
period, ICD on purchases, inventory, treasury and taxes (for SD) decrease over time, while ICD 
on human resources, fixed assets and intangibles, period end and reconciliations increase over 
time (p-value statistically significant). Inventory decrease in the number of less severe ICD and 
increase in the number of significant deficiencies. 
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5.3.Control Variables 
 
Table 6 reports names, definitions and descriptive statistics for company-level control 
variables. 
 
Table 6 - Sample Composition and Descriptive Statistics on Company-Level Control Variables: 
Mean (Std. Dev.) or Percent = 1 
 
Variable Firms-
year 
(n=84) 
SIZE Natural log of total assets 13.85 
(1.86) 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before 
extraordinary items from the income statements in years t is 
less than zero, and zero otherwise 
21% 
FOREIGN An indicator variable equal to 1 if is present an Other 
Comprehensive Income related to foreign transactions 
38% 
SEGMENTS The number of operating segments reported in the financial 
statement notes  
3.46 
(2.369) 
B/M book value / (share price * number of shares outstanding) 3.41 
(11.35) 
FIRM AGE Number of years from establishment (companies history in 
their web site) 
50 years 
(37) 
M&A An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is involved in a 
merger or acquisition in year t, and zero otherwise 
62% 
RESTRUCT. An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is involved in a  
restructuring in year t, and zero otherwise 
22% 
GOVERNANCE 
SCORE 
A composite measure of factors encompassing 7 corporate 
governance categories: board of directors size, board of 
directors meeting, directors education, directors experience, 
directors independence, audit committee size, audit 
committee meeting.  
-0.73 
(0.29) 
LITIGATION The gicsgroup codes considered as litigation industry based 
on Ashbaugh et al. (2003) are 2520-Consumer Durables and 
Apparel, 2550-Retailing, 2010-Capital Goods, 3010-Food & 
Staples Retailing, 4530-Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment, 3520-Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life 
Sciences, 4510-Software & Services, 4520-Technology 
Hardware & Equipment 
27% 
BIG4 Indicator variable, 1= if the auditor is D&T, KPMG, E&Y or 
PWC, 0=otherwise 
89.74% 
AUDIT FEES Natural log of  audit fees paid to the auditor 6.38 
(1.55) 
All the continuos variables are in thousands of Euro and are winsorized at 1% 
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The mean log of total assets is 13.85 (the mean in euro is €7121 million and the median 
in euro is €627 million). The frequency of loss is 21%. Complexity can be seen by the level of 
diversification, measured through the number of operating segments reported in the financial 
statement notes, and the level of internationalization, measured through a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if an Other Comprehensive Income related to foreign transactions is present. On average, 
sample companies have 3.46 segments. 38% of the sample has an other comprehensive income 
related to foreign transactions. 
The companies are on average 50 years old and a book value of 3.46 times the market 
value. There is a significant presence of merger or acquisition (62%) and a moderate presence 
of restructuring (22%) following the definition of variables by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007). 
27% of the sample is considered to be in a high litigation industry. This is defined using the 
“gicsgroup” Global Industry Classification codes following the definition of Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) who use the SIC – Standard Industrial Classification codes. The gicgroup codes labeling 
litigation industries are 2520-Consumer Durables and Apparel, 2550-Retailing, 2010-Capital 
Goods, 3010-Food & Staples Retailing, 4530-Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment, 
3520-Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences, 4510-Software & Services, 4520-
Technology Hardware & Equipment. The governance score is a composite measure of factors 
encompassing seven corporate governance categories: size of board of directors, board of 
directors meetings, director qualifications, director experience, director independence, audit 
committee size, audit committee meetings. The mean is the average of the factor score from a 
factor analysis. 89.74% of our Italian sample is audited by one of the Big4, consistent with their 
market share of the population of the Italian listed companies. The mean log of audit fees is 
6.38. 
 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
The results in Table 7 and 8 show that the variables of interest increase the Pseudo R2 
from Model 1 to Model 2: from 20.7% to 32% for severity and from 48.5% to 67.6% for 
persistence. Most of the variables regarding INTERNAL AUDITOR DETECTION PROCESS 
are significant and have a negative sign as expected with both severity (RQ1a) and persistence 
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(RQ1b). Results confirm the lower probability of discovering a more sever ICD in companies 
with higher overall quality of internal control. 
The use of quantitative and qualitative indicators for firms, financial statement values 
and accounts selection in SCOPING decreases persistence and increases severity. This result 
suggests that using only quantitative indicators is less discretionary and for this reason may be 
a preferred approach to reduce ICD severity; but the use of both qualitative and quantitative 
indicators however help in the long term perspective reducing ICD persistence. 
A high level of SCOPING QUALITY decreases the presence of more severe ICD. 
Results suggest that companies would be well-advised to use several qualitative indicators, to 
consider the relationship with the holding company and to use a top-down approach. However 
these specifications are not important in decreasing persistence (opposite sign found). 
We find that the speed of the testing process (FREQUENCY) is negatively associated 
with the detection probability of SD and MW and the ICD persistence. Our results show that 
the best test frequency would be to cover all account-specific controls, entity and information 
technology control every semester. 
The high level of TESTING QUALITY decreases the presence of more severe ICD. 
Our results show that the presence of re-performing or observation rather than only document 
inspections, the operation effectiveness tests on IT and entity level controls, the consolidation 
of results are all negatively associated with the detection probability of SD and MW.  
The ICFR AUDITORS QUALITY decreases the presence of more persistent ICD. 
Segregation of duties, higher education and experience have an impact on the ICFR quality 
reducing the persistence of their ICD. 
 
Comparing with revenues all the other account specific ICD TYPES are less severe 
(negative and significant coefficients) supporting the results of prior literature for RQ2a. 
For RQ2b, Inventory, fixed assed and intangibles, taxes, treasury and subsidiary specific 
are less persistent than revenues (negative and significant coefficients) while human resources 
and period end are more persistent (positive and significant coefficients). 
Implications of these results are that internal controls have to give importance in the 
evaluation of account-specific control on revenues, human resources and period end. 
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Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007; Ge and McVay, 2005; 
Raghunandan and Dasaratha, 2006; Hoitash et al., 2008; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Krishnan 
et al., (2008), the control variables for which the coefficient has the expected sign significant 
are SIZE, LOSS, B/M, RESTRUCTURING, LITIGATION for severity and SIZE, LOSS, 
FIRM AGE, GOVERNANCE SCORE and AUDIT FEES. Our results confirm that bigger 
companies, companies with good performance, less complex and risky companies all present 
less severe and persistent ICD. Less persistent ICD are also present for  companies with an high 
corporate governance quality and with a less costly external audit based on a better internal 
control system. Indicator of risky companies (foreign, B/M, restructuring, merge and 
acquisition, litigation), even if they cause more severe ICD, they do not cause more persistent 
ICD, reversing their effect over time. 
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Table 7 - Severity 
  SEVERITY 
Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 
INTERNAL AUDITOR 
DETECTION PROCESS 
     
SCOPING -   2.722 (3.52)*** 
SCOPING QUALITY -   -1.98 (-3.93)*** 
FREQUENCY -   -1.989 (-5.76)*** 
TESTING QUALITY -   -2.91 (-3.42)*** 
ICFR AUDITORS QUALITY -   0.409 (0.90) 
ICD TYPES      
ACC_PURCHASE -   -1.103 (-6.88)*** 
ACC_INVENTORY -   -3.496 
(-
13.93)*** 
ACC_HUMAN RESOURCES -   -1.717 (-8.94)*** 
ACC_FIXEDASS.INTANGIBLES -   -1.522 (-8.23)*** 
ACC_TAXES -   -1.291 (-4.38)*** 
ACC_TREASURY -   -1.665 (-8.56)*** 
ACC_PERIOD-END -   -1.642 (-9.93)*** 
ACC_ RECONCILIATION -   -1.43 (-5.56)*** 
ACC_SUBSIDIARY SPECIFIC -   -1.761 (-6.91)*** 
CONTROL VARIABLES      
SIZE - -0.557 (-4.49)*** -0.585 (-1.93)*    
LOSS + 0.227 (1.10) 0.767 (2.79)***  
SEGMENTS + 0.18 (4.13)*** -0.11 (-1.10)    
FOREIGN + -0.453 (-2.23)** 0.218 (0.89) 
B/M + 0.774 (10.55)*** 1.686 (5.25)*** 
FIRM AGE - 0.00182 (0.43) 0.000364 (0.04) 
RESTRUCTURING + -0.201 (-0.46) 3.636 (3.28)***  
M&A + 1.146 (5.35)*** -0.349 (-1.07)    
GOVERNANCE SCORE - 4.157 (4.95)*** 3.673 (1.49) 
LITIGATION + 1.163 (3.55)*** 4.963 (2.72)***  
BIG4 + 1.289 (4.01)*** 2.38 (1.92) 
AUDIT FEES + -0.577 (-4.50)*** 0.101 (0.41) 
CONSTANT  7.194 (3.45)*** 19.22 (2.63)***  
Year indicator variables  Included  Included  
Pseudo R2  0.207***  0.32***  
Observations   4284  4284  
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Table 8 - Persistence 
  PERSISTENCE 
Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 
INTERNAL AUDITOR 
DETECTION PROCESS 
     
SCOPING -   -1.303 (-9.53)*** 
SCOPING QUALITY -   0.531 (4.46)*** 
FREQUENCY -   -1.321 (-9.94)*** 
TESTING QUALITY -   0.0821 (0.45) 
ICFR AUDITORS QUALITY -   -0.52 (-3.18)***  
ICD TYPES      
ACC_PURCHASE -   0.0835 (0.33) 
ACC_INVENTORY -   -0.691 (-2.37)**   
ACC_HUMAN RESOURCES -   1.334 (4.94)*** 
ACC_FIXEDASS.INTANGIBLES -   -1.076 (-3.50)*** 
ACC_TAXES -   -1.438 (-3.13)***  
ACC_TREASURY -   -6.449 (-11.72)*** 
ACC_PERIOD-END -   2.79 (10.80)*** 
ACC_ RECONCILIATION -   0.0845 (0.21) 
ACC_SUBSIDIARY SPECIFIC -   -2.377 (-6.51)*** 
CONTROL VARIABLES      
SIZE - -0.428 (-5.64)*** -0.306 (-2.93)***  
LOSS + -0.486 (-2.95)*** -1.584 (-5.94)*** 
SEGMENTS + -0.0147 (-0.48) 0.00843 (0.18) 
FOREIGN + 0.079 (0.40) -0.67 (-2.33)**  
B/M + -0.0381 (-7.60)*** -0.0608 (-6.70)*** 
FIRM AGE - -0.0195 (-7.40)*** -0.0369 (-7.90)*** 
RESTRUCTURING + -1.195 (-6.69)*** -0.487 (-1.99)**   
M&A + -0.264 (-1.83)* -0.612 (-2.76)***  
GOVERNANCE SCORE - -2.223 (-5.18)*** -2.741 (-4.99)*** 
LITIGATION + -3.14 (-13.21)*** -7.139 (-12.16)*** 
BIG4 + -4.938 (-17.27)*** -12.74 (-19.59)*** 
AUDIT FEES + 0.245 (3.62)*** 0.209 (2.14)**  
CONSTANT  9.535 (8.05)*** 30.38 (11.27)*** 
Year indicator variables  Included  Included  
Pseudo R2  0.485***  0.676***  
Observations   4284  4284  
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7. CONCLUSION  
 
The paper contributes to literature on ICFR by examining the relationship between the 
severity and persistence of ICD and their type and detection process in a country where a “light 
SOX” does not assure that information about ICD is publicly available and where external 
auditors are not involved in ICFR assessment and reporting. Bedard & Graham (2011) conclude 
that in the USA, SOX does not lead to effective disclosure. The problem is more severe in Italy, 
where the implementation of the CONSOB report has not led to disclosure at all.  
The research measures internal auditor detection process with multiple variables 
classified as planning and scoping, testing and monitoring, ICFR auditor and control variables. 
Variables were measured for a start-up period (2007 – 2009) and an operating period (2010 -
2012). All the indicators improved over the period. The biggest improvement is related to 
“Account tests for financial reporting”, followed by “Account test type”. 
The descriptive show that the following ICD types have the highest percentages: 
accounting period-end/accounting policies, purchases, inventory, revenues, human resources, 
fixed assets and intangibles. The most severe ICD are purchase and revenue, while the ICD that 
increase more over time are on human resources, fixed assets and intangibles, period end and 
reconciliations. 
When the quality of internal auditing activity is high, the results show a reduction in 
ICD severity and persistence. In line with previous research, results confirm that revenues are 
one of the most critical areas for ICFR because more severe ICD are likely to be identified here 
and that human resources and period end ICD are also critical because they are higher related 
to probability of persistence.  
The findings may be limited in their generalization by several features of its design. 
First, it is difficult to directly compare the proportions of MW identified in our sample with 
public disclosures, as individual control flaws may be aggregated in these reports. Second, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that non-random selection might have influenced our results.   
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